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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberal political theory has for the most part ignored the
family on the unstated assumption that the family is not an insti-
tution relevant to political life.' Under liberalism, the domestic
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. B.A., 1983, Yale
University; J.D., 1987, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank David Cole, Richard
Dailey, Steven Ecker, Carolyn Jones, Rick Kay, Martha Minow, Laurie Parsons, Jeremy
Paul, Nomi Stolzenberg, and Carol Weisbrod for their extremely helpful comments and
criticisms. Special thanks go to my research assistant, Nancy Meyer.
1. See SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 9 (1989); CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THE-
ORY 3 (1989). A recent exception to this tradition is the work of Michael Walzer. See
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
227-42 (1983). Legal philosophers in the liberal tradition have, by virtue of omission,
agreed. See infra Part II.
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sphere of family life is generally perceived as lying outside the
realm of legitimate political discourse. Set apart from the public
world of work and politics, the family is understood to offer a
private sanctuary of individual freedom safe from intervention
by government or other public forces.
Since the early part of this century, the Supreme Court has
adopted a view of the family as a private institution wherein
individuals may pursue their own conception of "the good life"
free from government intervention. This constitutional doctrine
of family privacy, which the Court has grounded in the guaran-
tee of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is said to preserve a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."' 2 This most "private" of social
institutions has established itself as a central focus of heightened
constitutional concern in a line of cases affirming the importance
of the family as a fundamental social unit.
Despite this vision of the private family in liberal theory
and constitutional law, political discourse on the family is hardly
an unknown phenomenon in this country. From laws prohibit-
ing divorce in the early years of the republic to contemporary
laws denying homosexuals the right to marry, the state has con-
tinually shaped and promoted a particular vision of family life.
Far from prohibiting state intervention in a prepolitical social
sphere, the ideal of family privacy expresses a particular set of
family values by protecting only those social relations that the
state deems worth protecting. The boundaries of family privacy
are drawn by political choice; and the decision regarding which
relationships fall within these disputed boundaries is one that
helps to define the content of family life.
The ongoing and increasingly heated debate over family
values and family structure is carried out today most vigorously
at the level of everyday politics. Issues of family life were at the
center of the recent presidential election, and legislation aimed
at improving, and even restructuring, family life has gained
increasing media attention and popular support. In the debate
over family values, conservatives tend to call for laws reinforcing
2. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
3. This line of cases, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), includes Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion),
and, most recently, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 40-54, 85-93.
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the traditional family, while progressives typically pursue legis-
lation addressing the needs of single parents and working
mothers. From across the political spectrum, family life has
moved to the forefront of our national political debate. It is time
for liberal theory and constitutional law to acknowledge the
existence and importance of political discourse on the family and
to relinquish the myth of family privacy.
This Article has two broad goals: the first is to draw atten-
tion to the central role that the family has played, and continues
to play, in shaping the Supreme Court's interpretation of consti-
tutional privacy. This insight carries important consequences
because it reveals a deep tension within privacy doctine between
the competing goals of safeguarding individual autonomy and
insulating communal familial relations. Individual and family
together may claim a right of privacy against unwanted inter-
vention by the state. But when individual and family interests
differ-when the family is divided-the personal autonomy of
the individual comes into direct conflict with the institutional
autonomy of the family unit. Within the framework of constitu-
tional privacy lies a fundamental conflict between the principle
of individual sovereignty and the principle of communal self-
government.4
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this conflict in
favor of individual rights by adopting a view of children as
"incompetent" individuals whose development depends on the
proper organic functioning of familial relationships of authority.
In the Court's view, parental authority is necessary to prepare
children for their "eventual participation in a free society."5 The
Supreme Court has thus come to define the constitutional right
of family privacy in terms of the development of future citizens
4. Contemporary constitutional scholarship has generally dealt with this conflict by
simply ignoring the family's independent constitutional significance, although exceptions to
this scholarly oversight do exist. See, eg., June A. Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-
Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463 (1983). Although Eichbaum and Hafen recognize the doctrinal conflict between
individual and family privacy, they draw from this insight very different conclusions from
those presented here. In Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. Cr.
REv. 329, although the author does not ignore the family, he contends that "principled
legitimacy for parental authority as such in preference to other sources of social power
commands no adherents yet among liberal or conservative Justices of this generation." Ia
at 351 (footnote omitted). This view is not true today, if it ever was.
5. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
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and the maintenance of a liberal democratic order. Yet in so
doing, the Court has opened up the "private" family to political
meaning and public control, thereby stripping constitutional
protection for the family of its privacy rationale. This Article
thus aims first to reveal the political meaning of family life
underlying the Supreme Court's commitment to family privacy.
The second goal of this Article is to formulate an alterna-
tive constitutional approach grounded in an understanding of
the family as a distinctly "public" institution serving distinctly
political ends. The Article contends that constitutional protec-
tion for the family unit need not-and indeed, should not-pro-
ceed from the assumption that the family is an inherently
"private" institution. Constitutional protection for the family
need not derive solely, or even primarily, from a principle of
negative liberty. Rather, constitutional protection of the family
ought to reflect an understanding of the family's distinct role as
a vital intermediate institution serving the communal ends of
political life. The family is deserving of constitutional protection
because of its essential role in creating and maintaining our
broader political order.6 In doctrinal terms, the Constitution
should be read to prohibit state action that threatens to under-
mine the family's place in the political structure otherwise estab-
lished by that document.
The family's structural role in our constitutional scheme of
government should be understood as twofold: the family both
facilitates and constrains the exercise of state power in a way
central to the proper functioning of our political system. The
family serves to facilitate existing governmental power by help-
ing to create responsible individuals capable of participating in
civil and political life. Whereas the doctrine of individual pri-
vacy simply assumes the existence of responsible, self-governing
individuals, the approach advocated here recognizes that the vir-
tues of family life-and in particular the loving authority of the
parental role-are necessary for the promotion and encourage-
ment of a responsible citizenry. Yet families also play a vital
role in maintaining the diverse moral values and traditions that
6. Cf. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132
(1991) ("A close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected
with language of rights; states' rights and majority rights alongside individual and minority
rights; and protection of various intermediate associations-church, militia, and jury-
designed to create an educated and virtuous electorate."). The main thesis of this Article
would add implied protection for the family to Professor Amar's list of intermediate
associations expressly mentioned in the Constitution.
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comprise the pluralist foundation of our liberal political order,
values and traditions that in turn serve to counter the threat that
unmediated state power poses to moral diversity. The family's
role in nourishing and sustaining diverse moral traditions is
what in part distinguishes our liberal democracy from totalitar-
ian political regimes committed to the elimination of the "pri-
vate" spheres of social life. As the locus of potential political
resistance, the family acts as an important institutional check on
the power of the state to mold citizens in its own image.
Yet not just any family structure will succeed in sustaining
the particular political system established by our Constitution.
A liberal democracy requires a corresponding substantive vision
of family life. Families are called on to promote the develop-
ment of individuals possessing values, expectations, and aspira-
tions consistent with a liberal democracy. They must carry out
their primary obligation of educating children in the civic vir-
tues, initiating them into an understanding of the political prin-
ciples that will ultimately tie them to the broader social and
political community. To this extent, the family's role in initiat-
ing children into political life suggests that there must be some
constitutional limits to the degree of family diversity a liberal
democracy may tolerate.7 When the Supreme Court extends
protection to the family unit, therefore, it is not merely carving
out a private sphere devoid of substantive content-a domestic
realm of negative liberty. Rather, it is designing specific values
and institutional structures that serve specific political ends.
Once we recognize that the structure of our political order
requires a corresponding substantive vision of family life, we
must determine the outlines of that substantive vision. This
Article contends that families can only succeed in the task of
raising children committed to political justice if the family itself
is an institution committed to fair, noncoercive practices. In
constitutional terms, this means that the structure of our govern-
ment rests on a promise of family justice. 8 The doctrine of fam-
7. It is unclear, for example, whether the liberal principle of toleration must-or
should-extend to the family that raises a child in a manner incompatible with the child's
future ability to participate in the broader political or civil community. In extreme cases,
of course, the state justifies intolerance of such family values by labelling the behavior
"child abuse" and removing the child from the home. The issue of the "incompatible"
family tradition and the potential limits to liberalism's toleration of diverse family tradi-
tions is discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 253-56.
8. For a fuller elaboration of the meaning of family justice, including a discussion of
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ily justice presented in the final section of this Article constitutes
an initial effort to make good on that constitutional promise.
The theory of family justice offers an alternative approach
to the family in constitutional law. The linchpin of this theory is
the recognition that the government necessarily plays a role in
the formation and maintenance of family life. The theory of
family justice posits that this role must nevertheless be limited
by the government's responsibility to sustain family lives com-
patible with a liberal democratic order. The normative content
of this theory-the idea that political justice requires a corre-
sponding vision of family justice enforceable under the Constitu-
tion-is elaborated at the conclusion of this Article.
Part II of this Article sets forth the conventional account of
the modern family as a private entity separate from and opposed
to the public world of work and politics. This Part outlines the
portrait of the private family drawn by many contemporary
social historians and political theorists, a portrait that underlies
the prevailing view of the development of privacy doctrine in
constitutional law. It challenges the recent tendency to explain
constitutional privacy in terms of a steady evolution away from
a private domestic sphere defined by status relationships toward
one defined by the voluntary association of equal individuals.
Instead, Part II argues that constitutional protection for the
family has remained a dominant focus of the privacy cases,
evolving alongside the right of individual autonomy. In this
manner, the doctrinal framework of constitutional privacy has
extended protection to both the individual and the family unit.
Part III dispels the illusion of harmony between individual
and family privacy and draws into question the "privacy" basis
for constitutional protection of the family. To illustrate the cen-
tral conflict within contemporary privacy doctrine between indi-
vidual freedom and communal authority, this Part discusses the
recent Supreme Court decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota.9 Hodg-
son presents the question whether a state may require notifica-
tion of both parents that their minor child intends to have an
abortion. It is a case that pits the individual right of the minor
to decide whether to obtain an abortion against the right of her
the traditional dichotomy between principles of justice and principles of family life, see
infra notes 219-64 and accompanying text.
9. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). The decision in Hodgson upholding parental notification with
judicial bypass was recently reaffimed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
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parents to help guide her decision. This Part focuses on Justice
Stevens's opinion in Hodgson in order to show how the claim of
individual privacy is inherently at odds with the concept of a
loving domestic sphere free from governmental intrusion. It
explores Justice Stevens's effort to protect the family unit, partic-
ularly the authority of parents, while simultaneously preserving
the autonomy of individual family members. His effort is impor-
tant not because he succeeds-he does not-but because it
reveals the political function of family life within our liberal
democracy. Although attentive to the political dimension of
family life, Stevens nevertheless fails to confront the implications
of his own insights for the doctrine of constitutional privacy.
His opinion never breaks away from the prevailing view of the
family as a sphere of negative liberty, free of political
significance.
Part IV presents an alternative model of the family's place
under the Constitution. Rejecting the prevailing model of the
family as a private association, this alternative approach is
rooted in an understanding of the family as an intermediate
political institution, one that mediates the direct relationship
between the individual and the state. Subpart A sets forth a cri-
tique of the traditional understanding of the family as a private
entity separate from and opposed to the public sphere of politics
and law. This subpart offers an alternative historical account of
the family as an inherently and necessarily public institution
subject to social and political norms. Subpart B presents the
conservative version of this "public" model of the family-a ver-
sion that appears to animate the Supreme Court's emerging def-
erence to state laws affecting family life. The view of the family
as a public institution, however, also possesses the normative
material for constructing a progressive vision for the family's
role in our political order. Subpart C explores the implications
of such a progressive vision for constitutional law and presents
an alternative constitutional model of family justice.
Part IV concludes that the structure of government guaran-
teed by the Constitution puts constraints on the power of gov-
ernment to create and regulate family life-constraints
determined not by the family's status as a "private" institution,
but by the family's political role in our liberal democratic
scheme of government. Illuminating the nature of that political
role and the contours of those governmental constraints is the
final subject of this essay.
1993]
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL PORTRAIT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY
Individualism, brought forth within the family, would turn
against it.
-Brigitte Berger & Peter L. Berger,
The War over the Family "
There exists a widely shared perception that constitutional
liberty extends protection to individual privacy."1 Conventional
wisdom holds that privacy doctrine focuses predominantly, if
not exclusively, on the protection of individual choice in matters
of a highly personal nature. In this prevailing view, the family is
constitutionally significant only because it falls within the sphere
of interests thought to be essential to individual freedom. The
debate surrounding constitutional privacy has been seen, there-
fore, as a dispute regarding the proper scope of this individual
right. The cases framing this debate-Griswold v. Connecticut,12
Roe v. Wade,13 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,14 and most
recently, Bowers v. Hardwick 1 -are viewed as marking the
boundaries of this individual sphere of private choice. From this
perspective, Bowers served to settle, at least in part, the debate
over the scope of individual privacy by holding that constitu-
tional freedom of choice extends no further than the traditional
family. In this view, the family is constitutionally significant
because it marks the boundaries to the personal realm of individ-
ual choice. 16
10. BRIGITTE BERGER & PETER L. BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY: CAP-
TURING THE MIDDLE GROUND 103 (1983), quoted in Susan Cohen & Mary F. Katzen-
stein, The War over the Family Is Not over the Family, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN, AND THE
NEW FAMILIES 25, 38 (Sanford M. Dornbusch & Myra H. Strober eds., 1988).
11. That this perception is widespread, even among those committed to a judicial
philosophy of self-restraint, seems undeniable in light of the recent questioning of then-
Judge Clarence Thomas at his confirmation hearing for appointment to the United States
Supreme Court. During that hearing, Judge Thomas expressly confirmed his belief that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a right of privacy. See Excerpts from Senate's Hearings
on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22 ("My view is that there is a
right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment."). Judge Bork has been the most highly
visible contemporary critic of this view, a position that he suggests may very well have cost
him a seat on the high Court. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 290-92 (1990).
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which extended to unmarried persons
the right to use contraceptives, poses some embarrassment for this view of constitutional
[Vol. 67
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This Article challenges the accepted notion that constitu-
tional privacy is concerned primarily with safeguarding individ-
ual liberty. The conventional view ignores the fact that the
family as an independent object of constitutional concern has
played a central, if not predominant, role in the development of
privacy doctrine. That role has not been restricted to delimiting
the sphere of individual privacy. Rather, since the early part of
this century, the family has been accorded independent constitu-
tional protection independent of the liberties enjoyed by its indi-
vidual members. The tension at the heart of constitutional
privacy has been, and continues to be, between the doctrines of
individual and family privacy: between, in other words, a liberty
of individual sovereignty and one of communal self-government.
This Part surveys the doctrinal history of constitutional pri-
vacy in an effort to elaborate why the family has been largely
ignored by conventional privacy scholarship. Part of the reason
for the family's absence from that scholarship lies in the account
of family life set forth in the prevailing social history. Although
the family has only recently come to the attention of social his-
torians, 17 a general understanding has emerged regarding the
development of the modern family. This understanding teaches
that sometime between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries
the family underwent a radical transformation from a public to a
private institution."' In this view, the family evolved from an
institution deeply connected with the -social and political com-
privacy. Although the case did involve the individual's right to decide whether to con-
ceive-a right arguably falling within the realm of decisions relating to traditional family
life-the Eisenstadt Court nevertheless expressly sanctioned contraceptive use outside the
marital relationship, and therefore outside traditional family life. See infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text.
17. Phillippe Ari~s is generally credited with having established the family as a focus
of serious historical inquiry. PHILIPPE ARIt.s, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HIs-
TORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., 1962); see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family His-
tory and Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 1135, 1138 (noting that "[i]n the twenty-four
years since that work appeared.... the body of work in this area has grown immensely").
Of course, eighty years earlier, Frederick Engels developed an historical theory of the fam-
ily. FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
STATE (1972); see ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 74
(1988) ("Engels' own work is an attempt to trace the development of the family and, conse-
quently, of women's work in relation to what he calls, revealingly, the development of
'labor.' ").
18. See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S
SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980); John
Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE
FAMILY 43 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979).
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munity into one separate from, and even in opposition to, the
public sphere of work and politics. This evolution of the family
is understood to have occurred along two distinct, but purport-
edly complementary, trajectories. The first concerns the family's
perceived transition from a public to a private institution, or
what will be called the "privatization" of the family. The second
concerns the family's perceived transition from a hierarchical
community to an egalitarian association of individuals, or what
will be referred to as the "liberalization" of the family. The pre-
vailing view sees these two transitions as being compatible-two
aspects of the broader historical movement from "status" to
"contract." 19
The traditional account of constitutional privacy has been
refracted through the lens of this social history. Privacy doc-
trine is generally understood to have itself evolved from protect-
ing the integrity of the family unit to protecting the autonomy of
individuals in personal matters. Yet the effect of this historical
lens has been one of distortion rather than clarification. The
prevailing account of constitutional privacy views the doctrine
as having "moved" in the same direction as the social history. It
perceives that constitutional liberty has evolved from a doctrine
protecting status and family rights to one protecting contract
and individual autonomy. As this Part argues, however, the
family as an independent institution has not in fact withered out
of constitutional existence, but is very much alive in privacy doc-
trine. The family as an independent institution continues to
serve as a vital and important measure of constitutional liberty.
A. The Privatization of the Family
The concept of family privacy generally is traced to the rise
of the modern family sometime during the nineteenth century.
According to traditional social history, the pre-industrial family
that existed in the United States prior to the nineteenth century
was not viewed as a private entity distinct from the larger
society.
Through much of the colonial period, most colonists conceived
of the family as part of a hierarchically organized, interdepen-
dent society rather than as a separate and distinct sphere of
experience. Households were tightly bound to the rest of soci-
ety by taut strings of reciprocity. Family and community were,
19. See infra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
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a seventeenth-century author asserted, "a lively representa-
tion" of each other.... A wide array of duties grew out of the
public nature and communal obligations of households in an
agrarian, mercantilist society. Family responsibilities ranged
from economic production and the transmission of estates to
craft training and dependent care. Though most fully defined
as such in the New England provinces, throughout colonial
America the family was seen as a public institution tightly inte-
grated into a well-ordered society: "a little commonwealth" in
historian John Demos's succinct phrase.2 0
This "little commonwealth" of family life was public not
only in the economic sense, but as the phrase implies, in the full
political sense as well. For seventeenth century political theo-
rists, familial and political authority were analogous, if not iden-
tical.21 In probably the best known example in preliberal
political thought, Robert Filmer developed his theory of the
patriarchal state by appealing to the natural authority of the
father as justification for the natural authority of the sovereign.2 2
The traditional history posits that the rise of industrial capi-
talism in the nineteenth century brought about a profound
20. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-5 (1985) (quoting JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COM-
MONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY at x (1970)); see also Ellen Dubois,
The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement: Notes Toward the Reconstruction of
Nineteenth-Century Feminism, 3 FEMINIST STUD. 63, 64 (1975) ("In seventeenth-century
New England, all community functions-production, socialization, civil government, reli-
gious life-presumed the family as the basic unit of social organization."); Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1497, 1516 (1983) (describing how under feudalism, "Etihe hierarchical family was an
integral part of hierarchical society"); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transfor-
mation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1835 n.120 (1985) (noting that
"[e]arlier centuries [than the nineteenth] did not perceive clear boundaries between the
family and society, and were willing to intervene directly in families and to use families to
carry out the policies of the state").
21. See JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 100-08 (1981); Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1139.
22. See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS (Peter Las-
lett ed., 1949). As Elshtain aptly describes:
In Filmer's world there is no split between, or even a drawing of public-private
lines; indeed, there is no private sphere-in the sense of a realm demarcated from
politics-nor political sphere-in the sense of a realm diverging from the pri-
vate-at all. Filmer so thoroughly politicizes the family and familializes the com-
monwealth that there is no room for individuals, whether male or female, to
conceive of themselves as having a number of diverse roles to play.
ELSHTAIN, supra note 21, at 103; see also LINDA J. NICHOLSON, GENDER AND HISTORY:
THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL THEORY IN THE AGE OF THE FAMILY 134 (1986) ("Underlying
Filmer's defense of the divine right of kings was an identification of familial and political
authority extending back to Adam.").
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change in the relationship between the family and the larger
society. 23 "[F]amilies began to shed their public, multifunctional
forms and stand in an increasingly segregated, private realm of
society." 24 As productive work previously performed within the
family was removed to the outside workplace, a radical separa-
tion of the home and marketplace emerged.25 In addition, other
societal changes are viewed as having contributed to the priva-
tization of the family during the post-Revolutionary period,
including the effects of declining family size.26 In the wake of
these material changes, the home came to be viewed in private
terms as a distinctly domestic sphere.
In this view of the family, privatization also worked a quali-
tative change in the nature of family life. Under the mantle of
23. With the ascendance of liberalism, this change is understood to have occurred
within political theory as well. Beginning with Hobbes and Locke, "patriarchalism lost its
credibility as a full-blown justification for, and theory of, politics." ELSHTAIN, supra note
21, at 125. As will be seen in the subpart that follows, however, patriarchy would not lose
credibility as a normative ideal of family life, even within liberal theory, for another three
centuries. See infra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
24. GROSSBERG, supra note 20, at 6.
25. As one author has observed:
Prior to the opening of the 19th century the vast majority of people in the world
lived on farms or in peasant villages. And for almost all of them the family was a
cooperative economic unit, with children and mother working along with hus-
band, even though usually there was a division of labor by gender. This was true
whether production was for subsistence or for sale. Even those relatively few
families which lived and worked in towns acted as cooperative enterprises in their
shops, inns, and other businesses. Home and work were close together, and wife
and husband participated in both.... This situation would change dramatically
with the spread of the industrial factory system in both Europe and America after
the 18th century.
DEGLER, supra note 18, at 5; see also NICHOLSON, supra note 22, at 106-07. For a socialist
perspective on this radical separation, see ELI ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, AND
PERSONAL LIFE 17 (rev. expanded ed. 1986) ("IT]he ideology of the family as an
'independent' or 'private' institution is the counterpart to the idea of the economy as a
separate realm, one that capitalism over centuries wrested free of feudal restrictions, cus-
tomary law, and state and clerical intervention.").
26. Michael Grossberg has identified "[a] series of interconnected changes [that]
marked the crucial transition of the family from a public to a private institution." GROSS-
BERG, supra note 20, at 6. He observes:
The economic moorings of the household shifted from production toward con-
sumption. Generational influences on family formation declined. New fertility
patterns resulted in declining family size. A new domestic egalitarianism
emerged to challenge patriarchy. Other alterations included companionate mari-
tal practices and contractual notions of spousal relations, an elevation of child-
hood and motherhood to favored status within the home, an emphasis on
domestic intimacy as a counterweight to marketplace competition, and a more
clearly defined use of private property as the major source of domestic autonomy.
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privateness, the family has increasingly come to be seen as a pri-
vate "haven" in a "heartless" public world of politics and finan-
cial interest.2 7 "The family as refuge, in which the wife assumed
a special role in preserving moral values, managing the home,
and rearing the children was an essential condition of survival in
industrial society: no man could endure an unrelieved competi-
tive existence. ' 28 In contrast to the selfish individualism and
amorality of the political and economic spheres, the family was
thought to operate according to the private virtues of love, altru-
ism and dependence. 29 Moreover, these private virtues tradition-
ally were the exclusive domain of women. The "public-domestic
distinction" arose as a deeply gendered ideological construct
associating the amorality of the public sphere with men and the
morality of the private sphere with women. The gender implica-
tions of the public-domestic distinction are most forcefully dis-
played by the "cult of domesticity," which came to define
women's role in the late nineteenth century,30 and by the rise of
the ideology of separate spheres in law.3 1 According to most
commentators, the boundaries of the private sphere settled
27. See CHRISTOPHER LAsCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
BESIEGED (1979); Eichbaum, supra note 4, at 368 (noting that "the implicit foundation of a
familial privacy right is the dominant cultural myth of the family as 'haven in a heartless
world' ").
28. Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1137. But see id. (criticizing "the crudeness of the
baldest forms of these instrumental theories" that link "[c]hanges in the family ... directly
to changes in economic arrangements or demands").
29. See NICHOLSON, supra note 22, at 43-44; Olsen, supra note 20, at 1505 ("The
morality of altruism has been supposed to animate the family to the same extent that the
morality of individualism has been supposed to pervade the marketplace.").
30. Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a His-
tory of Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 819, 836.
Although there is some disagreement about when the cult of domesticity devel-
oped and gained dominance,... scholars contrast a colonial era in which women
held an important status and participated in the economic and public life of the
community with later periods when women's family roles excluded them from
participation in the broader community.
Id. Historians are beginning to explore the class bias underlying the cult of domesticity by
examining its relevance to women outside the urban, middle-class environment. See id. at
866-77; see also ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 56 (1977);
NICHOLSON, supra note 22, at 44-45.
31. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); see also PATEMAN,
supra note I, at 123 ("As capitalism and its specific form of sexual as well as class division
of labour developed .... wives were pushed into a few, low-status areas of employment or
kept out of economic life altogether, relegated to their 'natural', dependent, place in the
private, familial sphere."); Olsen, supra note 20, at 1499 ("In the early nineteenth century,
as men's work was largely removed to the factory while women's work remained primarily
in the home, there came to be a sharp dichotomy between 'the home' and 'the [workaday]
world.'" (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
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neatly, if restrictively, around a vision of the loving, maternal
home.32
The traditional history of this transition to the private fam-
ily is mirrored in the rise of the constitutional doctrine of family
privacy. Although the family finds no express protection in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has established a strong tradi-
tion of constitutional protection for "the sanctity of the family"
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The Court has interpreted the constitutional guarantee of "lib-
erty" in that clause as recognizing a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."' 34 This constitutional connection
between liberty and privacy derives from one of the central ten-
ets in liberal political theory: the distinction between the public
and private spheres of human life. Liberal theory conceives of
32. For discussion of the way in which this conventional history of the family fails to
reflect the social reality of nineteenth century family life, see Minow, supra note 30, at 851-
64. Professor Minow points out the racial and class implications of the conventional ideol-
ogy. See id. at 860-77.
33. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see
also Martha Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, J. AM.
HisT. 959, 962 (1987) (describing how Supreme Court decisions "have tended to take as a
given the narrative of continuous constitutional protection for the private sphere of the
family"); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Comment, The Relationship of Constitution and Tradition,
53 S. CAL. L. REv. 645, 652 (1980) (noting that "[a]lthough the United States Constitution
does not expressly provide protection to the family as an institution, there is a long line of
constitutional cases that appear to have precisely that effect").
In addition to Moore, other cases falling within this tradition of family privacy under
the Due Process Clause include Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). Related cases arising under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause include Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
34. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
35. As the political theory that dominates our constitutional discourse, contemporary
liberalism serves to orient our inquiry into the history of the family. Liberalism may be
crudely but accurately defined as a theory committed to the ideal of individual freedom and
to the principle of individual rights securing that freedom. John Stuart Mill described
liberalism as committed to "one very simple principle":
That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war-
rant.... The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to
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the world as divided between the public sphere of state regula-
tion and the private sphere of individual freedom. 36 Under liber-
alism, the state's limited function "is to guarantee to all
individuals an equal opportunity for moral development and
self-fulfillment. '37 Although the state may act to safeguard the
principles of individual autonomy and freedom, it must never-
theless "refrain from intervention in the 'private' lives of individ-
uals and from imposing moral values that would threaten
individual autonomy. ' 38 The most sacred public right-the
society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself,
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.
JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in PREFACES TO LIBERTY: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 236, 250-51 (Bernard Wishy ed., 1984).
There is a growing body of literature devoted to demonstrating the importance of
classical republican ideology for constitutional law and theory. See, e.g, Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sympo-
sium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). The theory of family
justice offered in Part IV of this Article might be understood to exhibit a healthy republican
skepticism toward the traditional liberal conception of the private, prepolitical family. As
discussed in that Part, however, family justice remains committed to pluralistic family
forms and family traditions and, to that extent at least, parts company with republican
commitment to the common good. For a discussion of the divide between feminism and
civic republicanism over the issue of social diversity, see Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's
Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993).
36. See JAGGAR, supra note 17, at 34 ("In the context of liberalism, those aspects of
life that may legitimately be regulated by the state constitute the public realm; the private
realm is those aspects of life where the state has no legitimate authority to intervene.");
Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423,
1424 (1982) ("Although one can find the origins of the idea of a distinctively private realm
in the natural-rights liberalism of Locke and his successors, only in the nineteenth century
was the public/private distinction brought to the center of the stage in American legal and
political theory."). The distinction between public and private has also been understood as
part of liberalism's approach to "seeing the world as a series of complex dualities." Gerald
E. Frng, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1075 (1980).
37. JAGGAR, supra note 17, at 35.
38. Id. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (noting that "the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government");
see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
32 (1988) ("The use of 'privacy' in connection with governmental interference with sexual,
reproductive, and familial free choice seems to derive from the concept of 'the private'
utilized in the public/private distinction .... ").
The public-private distinction underlies the doctrine in many constitutional areas.
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) ("The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security."); id. at
203-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "the Due Process Clause as construed by
our prior cases [may create] no general right to basic governmental services," although
noting that "[n]o one... has asked the Court to proclaim that, as a general matter, the
Constitution safeguards positive as well as negative liberties"); see also Susan Bandes, The
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right that government was instituted to safeguard-is the right
to keep government out of one's affairs.3 9
The Supreme Court first gave express constitutional recog-
nition to the right of privacy in the 1965 decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,4° a case challenging a state law that prohibited the
use of contraceptives by married couples. In striking down the
law, Justice Douglas described the nature of this fundamental
freedom:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.4 I
The decision in Griswold thus established constitutional protec-
tion for the privacy of the traditional marital unit. Under Gris-
wold, constitutional liberty meant protection for family
relationships.
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly articulate
this right of family privacy until the decision in Griswold, it now
locates the origin of the doctrine of family privacy in two deci-
sions from the 1920s, Meyer v. Nebraska 42 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters. 3 Although these two cases were originally decided on
the basis of the fundamental right of contract, the Court has
since identified them as the precursors to the modern right of
privacy.' In Meyer, the Court invalidated a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of subjects in any language other than
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990) (discussing public-private
distinction underlying state-action doctrine).
39. Laurence Tribe has described "the animating paradox of the right of privacy" as
"revered by those who live within civil society as a means of repudiating the claims that
civil society would make of them." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-1, at 1302 (2d ed. 1988).
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. Id. at 486.
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
43. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 190 (1986). The Court first identified this tradition of family privacy in 1944 in
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (describing Pierce and Meyer as deci-
sions that "have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter").
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English.45 Because the appellant was an instructor, the "liberty
interest" relied on by the Court to invalidate the law was the
instructor's right "to teach and the right of the parents to engage
him... to instruct their children. ' 46 However, the Court sug-
gested that more was at stake in Meyer than simply the eco-
nomic liberties of instructor and parent. Although the Court
clarified that parents have the right to enter into this educational
contract, this was a right they possessed as parents. The Court
implied that their right to contract derived from "the power of
parents to control the education of their own." 47
Relying on Meyer, the Court in Pierce struck down an Ore-
gon statute requiring public school education on the ground that
the law "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol. ' 48 The Court further elaborated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.49
Because the parents were not parties to the suit, however, the
Court went on to base its decision on the state's unreasonable
interference with the business and property interests of the pri-
vate schools bringing the suit.50
The connection between economic and domestic rights in
both Meyers and Pierce is significant. Both cases were decided
at a time when the Supreme Court recognized the right of con-
tract as a fundamental aspect of individual liberty. During the
reign of Lochner v. New York, 5 the right of contract was viewed
as the quintessential "private" right and the market was seen as
the paradigmatic "private" ordering mechanism within soci-
45. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. The law also prohibited the teaching of all foreign lan-
guages prior to the eighth grade. The Nebraska Supreme Court had construed this provi-
sion to allow the teaching of the "so-called ancient or dead languages." Id. at 400-01.
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 401.
48. Pierce v. Society 6f Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
49. Id. at 535.
50. See id. at 535-36.
51. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ety.5 2  With the recognition of parental rights in Meyer and
Pierce, the Court brought the domestic sphere within the protec-
tive scope of the Constitution, thereby establishing limits to the
power of the state to regulate within this sphere. The domestic
sphere, like the economic marketplace, was "privatized" in the
sense that it, too, became a realm of negative liberty whose mem-
bers had a claim to freedom from state intervention. Soon there-
after, with the demise of economic due process, the economic
marketplace "went public," leaving the family alone to define
the constitutional sphere of privacy.5 3 In this manner, the pub-
lic-private distinction evolved during this period from a distinc-
tion between politics and the marketplace to a distinction
between politics and the marketplace on the one hand and the
family on the other. With the emergence of the private family,
the public-domestic distinction was established in constitutional
law.5 4
B. The Liberalization of the Family
As indicated, the traditional social history of the family
does not conclude with the family's transition from a public to a
private institution. The history goes on to trace a subsequent
movement toward increasing individualism and equality within
the family. 5  The rise of individualism within the domestic
sphere is often associated with the broader progression described
by Sir Henry Maine as "a movementfrom Status to Contract.56
52. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 873
(1987).
53. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The family is perhaps
the only constitutionally protected intermediate institution not expressly recognized by the
Constitution. Those institutions expressly identified include the church, the militia, and the
jury. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1132.
54. Although the "public-domestic" distinction emerged early in this century with
the development of the doctrine of family privacy, only recently did feminist theorists
uncover this "hidden" distinction in political and constitutional theory. See, e.g., OKIN,
supra note 1; PATEMAN, supra note 1; Olsen, supra note 20.
55. Frances Olsen has termed this movement "the liberalization of the family."
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835,
840 n. 10 (1985) (defining "liberalization of the family" to include the "shift from the con-
cept of a private family into which the state should not intervene to the concept of individ-
ual privacy regarding intimate relationships").
56. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HIs-
TORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Beacon Paperback ed.
1970) (1861). Maine described progressive societies as "distinguished by the gradual disso-
lution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The
Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take
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Martha Minow describes this movement from a medieval world
of legal status toward a liberal ideal of individual autonomy:
Legal and political transformations, beginning with the Renais-
sance and continuing into the present, rested on an emerging
idea of the individual who has distinct and self-interested
desires and who needs freedom of action and protection from
the interference of others. Law and politics increasingly
addressed the relationship between the individual and the state,
replacing attention to feudal obligations. Renaissance political
theorists began to define the task of government as protecting
the rights and freedoms of each individual. Centralized gov-
ernments began to overshadow local lords in power and signifi-
cance, and eventually national laws became the instrument for
effecting sovereign power and preserving individual rights.
Extensive trading and marketplace exchanges developed as
merchants traveled to buy and sell goods. Contract became the
central framework for legal and political relations. Recipro-
cal-and nonhierarchical-obligations, freely chosen by self-
defining beings, became the preferred pattern underlying eco-
nomic transactions and political action.5 7
Emerging from this account of the history of the family is the
conclusion that over the last 150 years the family finally shed the
vestiges of its feudal past by moving from an integrated, hierar-
chical community to an association of equal individuals. 8 This
perceived liberalization of the family derives from a perception
that the private domestic sphere retained the patriarchal struc-
ture that characterized the status hierarchies of feudal life.
Under the patriarchal family, men and women were assigned to
specific family roles. They were integrated into an hierarchical,
unitary organization with men at the top and children at the
bottom.
Many historians argue that a new conception of the family
as an association of individuals emerged during this century
largely as a result of the movements for social equality-particu-
larly those movements seeking greater rights for women. 9 In
account." Id at 163; see also MARY A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY 41-42 (1981); Minow, supra note 30, at 834.
57. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW 123-24 (1990) (describing the prevailing view).
58. See Minow, supra note 30, at 833.
59. See Elizabeth B. Clark, Self-Ownership and the Political Theory of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, 21 CONN. L. REv. 905, 906 (1989) ("[Fleminism's contribution to liberalism was
to reinforce and greatly expand the individual's zone of privacy-to widen the definition of
rights beyond the rights of the individual in his civil status to include the rights of the
1993] 973
TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
the view of these historians, the transition toward individualism
and equality within the family began with the movement toward
greater rights for women in the mid-nineteenth century.' They
recognize that the private family was not a "haven" for women
who were confined within its patriarchal walls.61
In the early modem period in the West, where the household
was the basic social unit and a male headed that household as a
consequence of older patriarchal kinship principles, the male
represented the household politically. Political participation
was not based on the principle of "one man, one vote," but
rather on the principle of "one household, one vote."'62
The women's movement is understood ultimately to have liber-
ated women from their traditional family roles and to have
transformed the private sphere from a patriarchal community to
an egalitarian association of individuals.63 Under pressure from
the women's movement, "[t]he patriarch was to be stripped of
his power in the home, and adult individuals were to return to
full autonomy, thereby perfectly fulfilling the promise of the
American Revolution and bringing personal liberty back to the
individual in her private capacity."); Minow, supra note 33, at 971 (noting that "[tihe
Court's deployment of rights rhetoric... may well have sources in the rhetoric used by and
on behalf of women and children in nineteenth- and twentieth-century feminism, Progres-
sivism, and the complex reform movements of the 1960s").
60. This movement gained public recognition in the United States with the celebrated
1848 women's rights convention in Seneca Falls. See generally Alice S. Rossi, Introduction
to Part 2 of THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 241 (Alice S. Rossi
ed., 1973) [hereinafter THE FEMINIST PAPERS]. Thereafter, the movement saw the adop-
tions of the Married Woman's Property Acts in the various states, beginning with Missis-
sippi in 1939. See Minow, supra note 30, at 830.
61. Not simply deprived of "a room of her own," the nineteenth century wife often
suffered physical abuse sanctioned under the doctrine of family privacy. See MINOW,
supra note 57, at 272.
62. NICHOLSON, supra note 22, at 4; see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*442 ("By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband .... ); see also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that Blackstone's theory meant that, while
the husband and wife are one person in law, "the one is the husband").
63. As Martha Minow states:
[T]he traditional view of the legal history of family relationships described a
movement from an era of patriarchal power reinforced by the state, consigning
women and children to a private sphere removed from political and economic
power, to an era of individual autonomy where each individual could claim and
enforce legal rights before the state. According to the traditional story, family
law expressed the last remnants of status hierarchies maintained in a feudal order,
but its last 150 years marked progress toward the liberal commitment to individ-
ual rights.
Minow, supra note 30, at 833-34.
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most immediate level." 64
Among other consequences, the rise of individualism meant
that marriage would no longer carry with it the prescribed hier-
archical status of husband and wife, but instead would constitute
a voluntary association of equal individuals. Although the fam-
ily still would be considered a private institution, it no longer
would operate under the ideology of separate spheres.65 By this
account, the individualist family is no longer an integrated, hier-
archical community, but instead a voluntary, consensual associ-
ation in which individuals of either gender are free to pursue
their own conceptions of the good life.6 6 Thus, the modem fam-
ily is not only private but also egalitarian.67
The movement toward individual rights within the family
during this century may be seen as part of a more general liberal
progression toward the elimination of intermediate institutions
in political life. The idea of individual privacy derives from lib-
eralism's "conception of individual self-interest as the only legiti-
mate animating force in society."' 68  From this liberal belief in
"the intrinsic and ultimate value of the human individual" 69
64. Clark, supra note 59, at 907.
65. Beginning with the 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the
Supreme Court's approach to gender under the Equal Protection Clause documents the
formal decline of the separate spheres ideology. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). The Court's reliance on asserted "real" gender differences in recent years, however,
arguably reinforces a modem version of the separate spheres ideology. See, e.g., Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender-based statutory rape law-
which effectively prohibited underage women but not underage men from engaging in sex-
ual relations-on the ground that women can become pregnant).
66. See, e.g., Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 J.L. & INEQUALITY 1, 6
(1984) (describing the view of the "liberal" family as "a voluntary collection of individuals
held together by bonds of sentiment in an egalitarian structure," which "constitutes a pri-
vate realm, clearly divorced from the 'public sphere' "); Olsen, supra note 20, at 1517
(describing "[t]he liberalization of the family [as] marked by shifts toward equal juridical
rights and the withdrawal of the state").
67. By focusing its attention on the gender relations between husbands and wives, the
traditional view of the private, egalitarian family obscures the issue of the hierarchy
between parent and child. This "hidden" hierarchy is the focus of further discussion
below. See infra Part III.
68. Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism, in AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL THOUGHT 57, 66 (1987). "Liberalism is grounded in a conception of individual
self-government. Its institutions are designed primarily to secure individual autonomy: the
freedom of each to choose and pursue his own ends, limited only by the principle that
others must be free to do likewise." Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 737, 761 (1989).
69. JAGGAR, supra note 17, at 33; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 172 (1977) (noting that right-based theories "place the individual at the
center").
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comes the view that "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral
fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to soci-
ety as a whole.' "70 Political rights under liberalism are not dis-
tributed on the basis of social or economic standing, and
intermediate institutions do not exercise any formal political
power. "The evolution of liberalism thus can be understood as
an undermining of the vitality of all groups that had held an
intermediate position between what we now think of as the
sphere of the individual and that of the state. ' 71 Individual pri-
vacy can be understood, therefore, as having eliminated the fam-
ily as an institution that mediates the relationship between the
state and the individual. In political terms, the liberal individual
stands alone.
This saga of increasing individualism within the family, like
the parallel story of privatization, finds support in the doctrinal
history of constitutional privacy. While this view recognizes
that Griswold and the early privacy cases involved claims assert-
ing a right of family autonomy against state intervention, 72 it
considers the 1971 decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird73 as the
moment when the Supreme Court shifted ground and clarified-
for the moment at least-that the constitutional right of privacy
belongs to the individual rather than the family unit. In an oft-
quoted passage from that decision, Justice Brennan interpreted
Griswold as standing for the principle of individual rather than
family privacy:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
70. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977)).
In his partial dissent in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Marshall
describes the right of individual privacy: "'Few decisions are more personal and intimate,
more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's
decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe-
whether to end her pregnancy.'" Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 463 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting American College, 476 U.S. at 772).
71. Frug, supra note 36, at 1088.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a law prohibiting the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons on equal protection grounds).
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free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.74
Conventional doctrinal history interprets Eisenstadt and subse-
quent decisions as confirming that the right of privacy, although
historically rooted in family relations, actually protects the indi-
vidual right of personal liberty.75 In constitutional as well as
political terms, therefore, the individual would stand alone.
The high-water mark of this shift to an individualist con-
ception of the right of constitutional privacy is, of course, the
decision in Roe v. Wade,76 in which the Supreme Court held that
a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy is
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty." Roe said nothing about the autonomy of the family
unit; rather, the case concerned the individual woman's right to
reproductive choice. Three years later, however, in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,77 the Court affirmed the individual's
constitutional liberation from familial ties implicit in Roe. In
Danforth, the Supreme Court struck down an abortion law
requiring both spousal and parental consent. With regard to the
spousal consent provision, the Court acknowledged the legiti-
macy of the asserted state goal "of fostering mutuality and trust
74. Id. at 453.
75. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstericians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986) (noting that "[o]ur cases long have recognized that the Constitution
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely
beyond the reach of government" (citing Griswold; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977))).
Laurence Tribe notes that:
[Tihe stereotypical 'family unit' that is so much a part of our constitutional rheto-
ric is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such 'exercises
of familial rights and responsibilities' as remain prove to be individual powers to
resist governmental determination of who shall be born, with whom one shall
live, and what values shall be transmitted.
TRIBE, supra note 39, § 15-20, at 1416-17 (footnotes omitted); see also GLENDON, supra
note 56, at 42 (describing the" 'emergence of the self-determining, separate individual from
the network of family and group ties'" in American constitutional law) (quoting Carlton
Allen, Introduction to MAINE, supra note 56, at xxvi); Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual
Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 627, 636 (1987) (describing
how "[tihe new constitutional right of privacy quickly became not a family right, but an
individual right"); Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1156, 1164 (1980) ("Since Roe v. Wade, the Court... has made clear that these
rights [of privacy] belong to individuals rather than family units and has held that some
exist regardless of whether their exercise is in a traditional family context.") (footnote
omitted).
76. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
77. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and
the marriage institution. '7 8  Although the Court expressed
appreciation for "the importance of the marital relationship in
our society," 79 it ultimately refused to elevate the paradigm of
family privacy and marital harmony over the right of the indi-
vidual woman to choose. Values derived solely from the priva-
tization of the family would have justified spousal consent in the
interest of preserving the integrity of the institution; neverthe-
less, the Court found that the ideal of family unity must give
way to the right of a woman to choose the course of her preg-
nancy. "The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband
disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two mar-
riage partners can prevail."8 0
With regard to the issue of parental consent, the Court in
Danforth similarly considered the state's asserted interests in
safeguarding the family unit and preserving parental authority,"'
but ultimately concluded that such goals were ill-served "where
the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in
conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has frac-
tured the family structure. ' 82 Peering through the lens of indi-
vidual privacy, the constitutional eye sees only a fractured
association of rights-bearing individuals.
The doctrine of individual privacy does not perceive any
direct connection between the private sphere and family life.
Although decisions relating to family life are undoubtedly cen-
tral to a person's identity, they do not define its limits.
While it is true that [the privacy cases] may be characterized by
their connection to protection of the family, the Court's con-
clusion that they extend no further than this boundary ignores
the warning... against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons
why certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
78. Id at 71.
79. Id. at 69.
80. Id. at 71. The Court concluded that "[i]nasmuch as it is the woman who physi-
cally bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the preg-
nancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor." Id. A majority of the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Danforth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992), which struck down a spousal notification provision. Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued in dissent that the provision furthers the state's legitimate interest in promoting
"'the importance of the marital relationship.'" Id at 2871 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69).
81. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
82. Id.
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cess Clause." We protect those rights not because they contrib-
ute, in some direct and material way, to the general public
welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individ-
ual's life.83
Under the doctrine of individual privacy, the family does not
mediate the political or constitutional relationship between the
individual and the state. The family as an institution is irrele-
vant to defining the proper scope of the private sphere. The doc-
trine of individual privacy eliminates the family from
constitutional discourse altogether; it renders the family politi-
cally and constitutionally invisible.
C. The Conflict Between Privatization and Liberalization
The traditional story of the liberalization of family life con-
fronts a formidable dilemma: it must account for the fact that
the family as a communal unit has been very much visible in the
two decades since Eisenstadt was decided, and indeed arguably
becomes m6re visible with the passing of each Supreme Court
term.
8 4
The interpreters of constitutional liberty have never with-
drawn protection for the "sanctity" of family life. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, for example, the Court struck down a
municipal housing ordinance that a plurality of the Court
viewed as "slicing deeply into the family itself."'85 Similarly, in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court discussed the consti-
tutional protection afforded to "personal affiliations" that
"attend the creation and sustenance of a family. ' 86 In case after
case involving constitutional privacy, the Court has emphasized
that the family unit and familial relationships define the core of
this fundamental interest.8 7 As illustrated by the recent decision
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the
Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765, 772 (1973) (arguing that "[a]t the
core of this [private] sphere is the right of the individual to make for himself ... the
fundamental decisions that shape family life").
84. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The Court has frequently
emphasized the importance of the family.").
85. 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977).
86. 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1978) ("Our jurisprudence histori-
cally has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children."); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source,
and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights,
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in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,88 the Justices appear to agree that
constitutional liberty protects the family unit from unjustified
state intrusion. In that case, Justice Scalia, speaking for a plu-
rality of the Court, and Brennan, arguing in dissent, agreed that
prior cases reflect what Scalia referred to as "the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-tradi-
tionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family."8 9
The family unit thus clearly continues to play a central role
within the broader doctrinal framework of constitutional liberty.
But what exactly is this role? We might view the family as serv-
ing an instrumental function in defining the reach of individual
privacy. In this view, the Constitution extends protection to
family relationships because such protection "safeguards the
ability independently to define one's identity that is central to
any concept of liberty." 90 The family, in other words, provides a
useful boundary to confine the otherwise potentially limitless
scope of individual liberty. In Bowers v. Hardwick,91 for exam-
ple, the Court held that the Constitution does not "reach so far"
as to protect individual privacy independent of family rela-
tions.92 As Justice Blackmun lamented in dissent, the Court in
Bowers definitively rejected the notion that the Constitution pro-
tects those interests which generally "form so central a part of
an individual's life," and instead defined the "boundary" lines of
constitutional privacy "by their connection to protection of the
family. 93
Bowers elevated the interests of the traditional family unit
over those of the autonomous individual standing outside the
family realm. In so doing, it necessarily deepened the conflict
arising when the will of an individual within the family opposes
the will of the family community itself. The family can be an
instrument of individual liberty only when the interests of the
as they have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.' ") (footnote omitted)
(quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503)).
88. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
89. Id. at 123. Justice Brennan agreed, noting that if "the plurality meant only to
describe the kinds of relationships that develop when parents and children live together
(formally or informally) as a family, then the plurality's vision of these cases would be
correct." Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Brennan disagreed, how-
ever, over the proper definition of the family for constitutional purposes.
90. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
91. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
92. Id. at 191.
93. Id. at 204.
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individual and the family unit are in harmony. Where families
are divided-as, for example, where individuals are opposed to
the will of the family community-the family no longer can be
seen as serving the individual's needs. The conflict between fam-
ily and individual privacy becomes manifest the moment individ-
uals within the family disagree over fundamental issues of
personal life and they seek, or the state requires, public adjudica-
tion of their internal disagreement. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, Bowers is significant not for the questions it answers about
the reach of individual privacy, but for those it raises regarding
the role of the family as an independent unit in constitutional
law.
The instrumental view of the family is ultimately unsatisfy-
ing. Family privacy, far from being instrumental to or even
compatible with individual privacy, is deeply antithetical to it.
The Supreme Court's express protection for the family as a com-
munal unit simply does not accord with a comprehensive vision
of individual autonomy. The rhetoric of family privacy does not
conform to an individualistic model. The doctrine of family pri-
vacy conceives of individual liberty in the context of communal
relations and a shared life. In sharp contrast, the doctrine of
individual privacy protects the sovereignty of the individual
apart from communal relations, and recognizes value in collec-
tive institutions only to the extent that they further individual
liberty. Individual privacy perceives family life to exist as a
product of individual rather than community will and to serve
individual rather than community interests. Although constitu-
tional privacy may present itself as a seamless doctrinal web, the
subdoctrines of individual and family privacy are in conflict over
the question whether the fundamental sphere of liberty stops
with the institutional community or extends to the individual
family member.
Individual autonomy and communal family life are compat-
ible only so long as family life remains harmonious. When fam-
ily consensus breaks down, and family members either
voluntarily seek or are legally required to seek public resolution
of their differences, constitutional protection for the family unit
becomes problematic. It is to this conflict within the "private"
family that this Article now shall turn.
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III. CONFLICT WITHIN THE "PRIVATE" FAMILY
Our political system is superimposed on and presupposes a
social system of family units, not just of isolated individuals.
No assumption more deeply underlies our society than the
assumption that it is the individual who decides whether to
raise a family, with whom to raise a family, and, in broad mea-
sure, what values and beliefs to inculcate in the children who
will later exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizens and
heads of families.
-Philip Heymann & Douglas Barzelay, The Forest and
the Trees 94
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,95 the Supreme Court addressed
the question posed at the end of Part I: how do we reconcile the
doctrines of individual and family privacy when the challenge to
familial authority comes from within the family unit itself?. This
Part argues that the doctrine of constitutional liberty can never
transcend the conflict between individual and family privacy as
long as we continue to conceive of the family as a private institu-
tion serving private ends. As the decision in Hodgson makes
clear, the principle of individual sovereignty demands a family
open to public scrutiny; constitutional liberty demands a family
of political significance. As will be seen, Justice Stevens's major-
ity opinion in Hodgson illuminates the political dimensions of
family life even as it strains unsuccessfully to maintain a worka-
ble version of family privacy.
In Hodgson, the plaintiffs challenged a Minnesota statute
that required a physician to notify both parents prior to per-
forming an abortion on a minor woman. The statute was
enacted in 1981 as an amendment to the Minors' Consent to
Health Services Act.96 Prior to this amendment, the Act author-
ized any minor to give consent without any parental involve-
ment for the treatment of "pregnancy and conditions associated
therewith," including abortion services.9 7 The amended statute
defined "parent" as "both parents of the pregnant woman if they
are both living, [or] one parent of the pregnant woman if only
94. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 83, at 772.
95. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
96. Id. at 423 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992)). The
statute specified that notice be made by the physician or her agent in person or by certified
mail at least 48 hours before the procedure was to be performed. Id. at 423 n.4.
97. Id. at 423 & n.1. The statute also authorized the minor to consent to services
related to "venereal disease, alcohol and other drug abuse." Id.
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one is living or if the second one cannot be located through rea-
sonably diligent effort."'9 8 Exceptions to the notification require-
ment were allowed when the abortion was necessary to save the
woman's life, when both parents had consented in writing, or
when the woman had been the victim of parental abuse or
neglect. 99 Finally, the statute provided that in the event that the
parental notification provision was ever enjoined, the same noti-
fication provision with judicial bypass would go into effect. 10°
Although the case spawned a confusing array of opinions
by a fractured Supreme Court, the ultimate holding of the case is
relatively straightforward. A majority of the Court voted to
strike down the two-parent notification statute standing alone,101
while a different majority voted to uphold the same notification
requirement when joined with a provision for judicial bypass.
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion striking down the
notification provision standing alone, 10 2 and it is his opinion that
will be the initial focus of discussion.
A. Authority Within the Private Family
In Hodgson, Justice Stevens holds that the two-parent noti-
fication statute constitutes an illegitimate state intrusion into the
private sphere of family life. 10 3 His conclusion draws on the con-
ventional portrait of family privacy in constitutional law: "[T]he
family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and education of
children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is
98. Id. at 425-26 & n.6.
99. In the case of abuse or neglect, the statute provided that the proper authorities
were to be notified.
100. Id. at 427 & n.9. This procedure allowed a minor to avoid notifying her parents
if she could convince a judge that she was "mature and capable of giving informed consent
to the proposed abortion," or that an abortion without parental notification would be in her
best interest. Id.
101. Id. at 450-55 (Stevens, J.). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, concluded that parental notification in any form, whether to one or two parents
and with or without judicial bypass, violates the minor's constitutional right of decisional
privacy. See id. at 461-79 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Justice Stevens also authored a dissent from the Court's judgment upholding
notification joined with judicial bypass. See id. at 455-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
103. Although Justice Stevens concludes that the state does have legitimate interests
in protecting the welfare of the pregnant minor and the rights of the parents to raise their
daughter, he strikes down the two-parent notification provision on the ground that those
interests are sufficiently protected by a requirement that only one parent be notified. See id.
at 452 ("The second parent may well have an interest in the minor's abortion decision,
making full communication among all members of a family desirable in some cases, but
such communication may not be decreed by the State.").
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protected by the Constitution against undue state interfer-
ence." 104 Cases invoking the constitutional doctrine of family
privacy have invariably quoted, as does Stevens, from the 1944
decision of Prince v. Massachusetts,105 in which the Supreme
Court stated that the Constitution protects "a private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter. ' 10 6 As discussed ear-
lier, 107 this doctrine of family privacy is related to individual pri-
vacy, in that both forms of privacy appeal to the liberal
conception of a private sphere of negative liberty. Whereas indi-
vidual privacy concerns the right of individuals to make deci-
sions regarding themselves, family privacy concerns the right of
the domestic community to make decisions regarding its own
welfare. The doctrine of family privacy protects a communal
right of self-governance.108
The concept of a self-governing institution immediately
poses a profound problem for liberalism's commitment to indi-
vidual sovereignty. Communal rights are compatible with lib-
eral theory only to the extent that individuals within the relevant
community agree.10 9 When families are divided, the rhetoric of
communal rights may serve to mask conflict and coercion
behind an ideal of ideal family harmony and love.110 Although
in Hodgson Justice Stevens recognizes the reality of intrafamily
104. Id at 446.
105. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
106. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 447 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
108. As one commentator has observed:
The claim of moral entitlement to be free from third-party, and especially govern-
mental, interference in the discharge of familial obligations is commonly
advanced as a claim of a right to family privacy. A moral right of family privacy
is deemed to be a right of family members to be free from uninvited, unwarranted
interference with the rearing, education, discipline, health, and custody decisions,
made by family members (usually adults) on behalf of members of the same fam-
ily (usually infants, children, teenagers, the elderly, or the infirm).
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 115-16.
109. In cases where the Supreme Court has recognized a right of family privacy, the
family has exhibited a more or less undivided front against intervention by the state. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing right of extended
family to determine for itself who will reside within the home).
Anita Allen raises but does not resolve the problem of intrafamily conffict: "If a moral
right of family privacy is ascribed a family unit, who is entitled to exercise that right? Who
is the spokesperson for the family's interest? What if family members disagree about the
desirability of governmental intervention?" ALLEN, supra note 38, at 117.
110. But cf Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1417, 1417-18
(1984) (advocating protection for communal rights in labor and free-speech areas).
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conflict and spends much of his opinion trying to dismantle the
myth of the happy American home, he fails to recognize that the
divided family cannot at the same time be both private and a
sphere of individual sovereignty. Stevens remains confident that
he can mediate intrafamily conflict while preserving the dual
constitutional principles of family privacy and individual auton-
omy; he seeks to accomplish this through the concept of parental
rights.
As Stevens explains, the doctrine of family privacy incorpo-
rates the concept of parental authority:
While the State has a legitimate interest in the creation
and dissolution of the marriage contract, the family has a pri-
vacy interest in the upbringing and education of children and
the intimacies of the marital relationship which is protected by
the Constitution against undue state interference. The family
may assign one parent to guide the children's education and the
other to look after their health. "The statist notion that gov-
ernmental power should supersede parental authority in all
cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repug-
nant to American tradition." We have long held that there
exists a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."111
For Stevens, family privacy is a right associated with traditional
parental prerogatives. The communal right of family privacy is
defined in terms of parental authority over children. Stevens
observes that "[a] natural parent who has demonstrated suffi-
cient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to
raise the children free from undue state interference." ' 1 2 Family
privacy boils down to the right of parents to exclude the state
from intervening in decisions regarding their children." 3
The concept of parental rights is at odds with the conven-
tional doctrine of family privacy in a straightforward way: if the
family is truly a private or self-governing institution, then rights
111. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446-47 (1990) (footnotes and citations
omitted) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). It is, of course, not at all self-evident why the state has a legitimate
interest in the formation and dissolution of the marriage contract.
112. Id. at 447.
113. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 112 (noting that "family privacy signifies the free-
dom of parents to exercise their authority and judgment in accordance with their own
values to promote the interests and well-being of themselves and their children"); Teitel-
baum, supra note 17, at 1175 (observing that each of the "family autonomy" cases in con-
stitutional law "allocates power to one family member or reserves it to the state. None
creates decisional rights in an entity.").
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that allocate authority within the community subvert that pri-
vacy. Defined in terms of parental authority, the doctrine of
family privacy does not protect a sphere of individual freedom
where all family members are free to pursue their own concep-
tion of the good family life. Instead, the sphere of family life is
carefully defined by the traditional hierarchical structure of par-
ent-child relations. 114
Parents have an interest in controlling the education and
upbringing of their children but that interest is "a counterpart
of the responsibilities they have assumed.".. . [T]he demon-
stration of commitment to the child through the assumption of
personal, financial, or custodial responsibility may give the nat-
ural parent a stake in the relationship with the child arising to
the level of a liberty interest.1 5
Parental rights are not simply a modified version of the individ-
ual right of privacy. Indeed, parental rights are not concerned
with individual sovereignty at all, but instead pertain to the right
of one individual to control another.
The problem may be stated in simple terms: any allotment
of liberty to the parents necessarily diminishes the liberty of the
child; conversely, any enhancement of a child's liberty curtails
that of the parents. Unlike the right of individual privacy-
114. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court derived the structure of
this private sphere (and the corresponding limits of state power) from natural law and "the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life."
Id. at 400. In this way, the Court read the Constitution to protect the natural order of the
domestic sphere, which, although it guarantees those relationships a certain measure of
freedom from state control, nevertheless includes the "natural" authority of parents over
children:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which
should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their
children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent.... The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to
the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in
a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they
chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as
they should be." In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent
education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation
between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter
and spirit of the Constitution.
Id. at 401-02 (omission in original).
115. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 445-46 (citations omitted) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
which entitles the individual to rights against the state and over
herself-parental rights entitle parents to rights against the
state, but over another person.1 16  By vesting parents with
authority over their children, liberalism must find a way to
resolve the apparent violation of its competing principle of indi-
vidual sovereignty. Parental authority, in the form of family pri-
vacy, confronts the will of the individual child. Before turning
to a discussion of Stevens's attempt to resolve this conflict, his
portrait of the minor's individual privacy interest must first be
considered.
Stevens holds that the minor possesses a liberty interest in
the decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, a holding that
falls directly in line with the tradition of individual privacy
established in Eisenstadt and Roe. The minor's right of individ-
ual privacy comports with the liberal conception of human
beings as rational individuals whose happiness or freedom
depends on their capacity for self-determination.' 1 7 Because the
individual right of privacy protects decisions regarding funda-
mentally personal matters, it has been termed an interest in
"decisional privacy."' 8 Constitutional protection does not
attach to the individual's affirmative right to obtain an abortion,
but instead is concerned with her right to decide whether or not
to abort." 9 It is a right protecting decisional freedom.
Although Stevens holds that minors possess the individual
right of decisional privacy, he concludes that they nevertheless
do not have full authority to exercise it. In his view, their
"immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely."' 120 He justi-
116. Stevens clarifies that this authority is not absolute but is limited by the child's
best interests. As he notes, "the justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in
the abortion decision rests entirely on the best interests of the child." Id. at 454.
117. See, eg., JAGGAR, supra note 17, at 28 ("Liberal political theory is grounded on
the conception of human beings as essentially rational agents."); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIB-
ERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 (1985) ("Locke suggests that this
capacity for rational self-determination is the distinctive feature of human nature and also
the essential element of moral responsibility.").
118. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 97.
119. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (noting that "Roe did not declare
an unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion,' . . . [but rather] protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy").
120. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444. The Court in Bellotti v. Baird similarly observed:
[he Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with poten-
tially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition
1993]
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fies this limitation on the exercise of the minor's right of individ-
ual privacy on the ground that children suffer from an impaired
ability to reason. 121 The commitment to decisional freedom that
underlies the doctrine of individual privacy is built on a vision of
human beings as capable of rational choice. By adopting a
model of "impaired capacity" or "incompetency," Stevens is
able to reconcile this intrusion on the minor's right of privacy
with solidly liberal principles.122 Because liberalism presumes
the rationality of individuals, lesser rights may be accorded
where the particular individual does not have the capacity for
full rational thought. From the liberal perspective, therefore,
interference with privacy rights on incompetency grounds is not
really viewed as intervention at all. State regulation of the
minor's privacy right does not reflect a substantive goal or value
choice, but rather a "neutral" attempt to protect the child from
her own immature decision-making abilities. As Stevens argues,
the parental notification provision is designed to insure "that the
minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelli-
gent, and deliberate," 12 3 and "rests entirely on the best interests
of the child." 124 Thus is he able to construe the parental notifi-
cation provision as facilitating individual liberty by helping the
that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (Powell, J.).
121. Because Stevens identifies minors as liberal individuals possessing full constitu-
tional rights, he must struggle to explain why they do not possess the independent author-
ity to exercise their rights. His recognition of the minor's impaired capacity necessarily
conflicts with his earlier conclusion that the woman's status as a minor does not deprive her
of access to the individual right of decisional privacy. Compare Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444
with id. at 434. According to his earlier reasoning, the Due Process Clause "protects the
woman's right to make such decisions independently and privately," even as a minor. Id
at 434. "'[T]he fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for
parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the
termination of the legal disabilities of minority.'" Id. (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642).
The distinction that Stevens implicitly draws between the possession and the exercise
of the right of individual privacy is not entirely consistent, and suggests that he is unsure
whether pregnant minors should be treated as responsible decision makers. Part of the
problem lies in the fact that he would like to uphold one-parent notification while striking
down two-parent notification. To do so, he needs to recognize a privacy interest that is
strong enough to allow him to strike down two-parent notification, while not so strong as to
prohibit one-parent notification.
122. Martha Minow argues that the category of incompetent individuals under liber-
alism reflects older notions of status derived from medieval law. See MINOW, supra note
57, at 124-28.
123. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450.
124. Id. at 454.
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minor to make her own decision in a mature and informed
manner.
Two-parent notification fails to pass constitutional scrutiny
for Stevens not because it intrudes on the minor's individual
right to privacy, but because in his view it violates the privacy of
the family unit by requiring communication between the
spouses. For Stevens, the infirmity lies not in notification itself,
but in the requirement that both parents be notified. Stevens
strikes down the statute not because parents have no legitimate
role to play in facilitating the exercise of their children's consti-
tutional rights, but because one parent's involvement is enough
to satisfy this state interest. One-parent notification "supports
the authority of a parent" to supervise the minor's decision. 125
Stevens's affirmance of parental rights goes beyond mere
constitutional tolerance. As Stevens suggests, not only is the
state constitutionally permitted to recognize parental authority,
it is constitutionally required to do so. He observes that had the
state bypassed the parents altogether and required judicial
review of the minor's decision, such a scheme would have vio-
lated the parents' independent right to raise their children free
from governmental interference. "'The statist notion that gov-
ernmental power should supersede parental authority in all
cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repug-
nant to American tradition.' "126 Indeed, all of the Justices in
Hodgson recognize, to some degree at least, parents' independent
constitutional right to control the upbringing of their chil-
dren.2 7 Although the Justices in Hodgson diverge in their opin-
ions on the permissibility of two-parent notification, they all
recognize that a minor's right of individual privacy is limited by
the competing right of parental authority. In other words, indi-
vidual autonomy within the family is directly limited by the con-
stitutional protection accorded to communal relationships of
authority. Let us now ask why.
125. Id. at 450. Stevens concludes that while one-parent notification furthers the
minor's interest in making her decision and the parents' interest in raising their children,
two-parent notification infringes on the family's right of privacy by enforcing communica-
tion between the spouses. Id. at 451.
126. Id. at 446-47 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)).
127. See id. at 447 (Stevens, J.); id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 482 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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B. The Political Dimensions of Family Life
As established in the preceding discussion, constitutional
protection for family privacy enforces the authority of parents at
the expense of the child's competing right of individual privacy.
Stevens resolves this dilemma in the conventional manner by jus-
tifying parental authority in terms of the child's emerging indi-
viduality. In so doing, he quotes from Justice White's decision
in Stanley v. Illinois:128
"The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of
the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and
'[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights.' 'It is car-
dinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder.' "129
This conception of parental authority is based on an understand-
ing of the family as providing the conditions necessary for the
individual's growth into independent adulthood-conditions
that the state "can neither supply nor hinder." Family privacy
protects the rights of parents to claim authority over their chil-
dren in order that those children may grow into responsible lib-
eral individuals capable of carrying out the "obligations" of
political life.
In this view, the family operates as an institution that
trains children to become responsible individuals with the skills
necessary for participation in social and political life.130 As Ste-
vens explains in Hodgson:
"Properly understood ... the tradition of parental author-
ity is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participa-
128. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
129. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 447 (alteration and omission in original) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer and Prince)).
130. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights" 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 605, 657
("Because of its preparatory role, maintenance of the family tradition is in fact a prerequi-
site to the existence of a rational and productive individual tradition."); Heymann & Barze-
lay, supra note 83, at 773 ("The immensely important power of deciding about matters of
early socialization has been allocated to the family, not to the government.").
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tion in a free society meaningful and rewarding." 131
From Stevens's perspective, parental rights are not fundamen-
tally concerned with the "liberty" of parents at all, but rather
with preserving the future liberty of children.132 Family privacy
protects a realm of parental authority that is not in itself a
sphere of negative liberty, but that is a means for the develop-
ment of responsible citizens. The doctrine of family privacy thus
serves a political function in furthering the constitutional liberty
of developing individuals and in sustaining the liberal demo-
cratic state itself. 33
Justice Stevens's approach preserves the principle of indi-
vidual autonomy by conceiving of parental authority as facilitat-
ing the development of individuals capable of autonomous
action and thought. Yet what this approach gains in terms of
individual autonomy, it loses in terms of privacy. The view of
the family as an institution worthy of constitutional protection
for its role in maintaining our political and social order is at
131. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444-45 n.31 (omission in original) (quoting Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (Powell, J.)). In Bellotti, Justice Powell elaborated
more fully on the relationship between parental authority and individual liberty:
[Tihe guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limita-
tions on the freedoms of minors .... "[T]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." . . - This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large part, is beyond
the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsor-
ship of particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the
State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of indi-
vidual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus, "[l~t is cardinal with us that the cus-
tody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither sup-
ply nor hinder."
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about the most effective
way for parents to fulfill their central role in assisting their children on the way to
responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this sub-
ject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and deeply rooted in
our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's children.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38 (Powell, J.) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), and Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
132. See Hafen, supra note 130, at 657 ("Family life... has served to nurture chil-
dren's readiness for responsible participation in the individual tradition.").
133. See Hafen, supra note 4, at 477 ("[T]he family in a democratic society not only
provides emotional companionship, but is also a principal source of moral and civic
duty.").
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odds with the traditional understanding of family privacy. The
loving authority of family life is constitutionally protected not
because it reflects a realm of negative liberty free from govern-
mental intervention, but because it carries profound political sig-
nificance as the source of future citizens.13 4
Parental authority is not, of course, without limits. Yet
those limits are themselves set by reference to the public ends of
family life. Parental authority is exceeded when it threatens to
impair the child's development into a responsible civic individ-
ual. The settled boundaries of parental authority inject a strong
normative vision of the "good citizen" into family life. Parental
authority must be exercised in a manner that preserves the
child's ability to choose her own values and way of life. It must
be exercised in the service of creating citizens equipped to par-
ticipate in a liberal democracy. The "tyranny" of parental
authority is thus understood to be a profoundly political
power. 135
In his dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 136 cited
most often for the principle that children have a right of individ-
ual autonomy within the family, Justice Douglas draws a clear
portrait of the normative content of parental authority. In his
seemingly lonely defiance of parental authority, Douglas dissents
on the ground that Amish children had the right to attend pub-
lic school against the wishes of their parents:
On this important and vital matter of education, I think
the children should be entitled to be heard. While the parents,
absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the educa-
tion of the child is a matter on which the child will often have
decided views....
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents
that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child
134. See infra notes 232-56 and accompanying text.
135. As Duncan Kennedy has stated:
[P]olitical philosophy refers constantly to the ideals of the family, and philoso-
phers of the family refer constantly to political ideals. The interpretation of the
two realms of discourse is so thorough that we might better speak of a single
political/familial rhetoric....
... [Tihe blurring of institutional lines between the state and the family is
more obvious than blurring along the market/family or market/state boundaries.
It has been common forever to speak of the public functions of the family in
producing and socializing "the next generation."
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
RaV. 1349, 1356 (1982).
136. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of
diversity that we have today. The child may decide that that is
the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the student's judg-
ment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full
meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of
the right of students to be masters of their own destiny. If he is
harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over
him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be
stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should be given an
opportunity to be heard .... 137
Even Douglas, however, does not directly challenge the concept
of parental authority. Rather, he believes that the limits of
parental authority were surpassed here when the Amish parents
withdrew their children from community education. Douglas is
particularly sensitive to the part that institutionalized education
plays in training children for their roles as adult citizens. In his
view, by depriving their children of this necessary training for
political life, the Amish parents had exceeded the bounds of
their lawful authority. Parental authority is justified, in his view,
to the extent that it facilitates the proper growth of the liberal
individual. To Douglas, part of that proper growth includes
participation in the "amazing world of diversity" that is civil life
in the liberal state. 138
Although the concept of parental authority lends meaning
to the doctrine of family privacy, it is not the same meaning
associated with the traditional view of the private family. The
conflict between children and parents is mediated by defining
family privacy in terms of parental authority. As we have seen,
however, parental authority identifies the family as an institution
that is, in part at least, an instrument of the liberal state. The
concept of parental authority preserves liberalism's commitment
to individual autonomy by conceiving of the family as facilitat-
ing the development of responsible individuals. The family is
worthy of constitutional protection because it is an institutional
source of liberal individuals. The doctrinal end is not the preser-
vation of "privacy." The enforcement of parental rights thus
reveals the deeply political character of the family in a liberal
democracy. 139
137. Id. at 244-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
138. See iad at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
139. Stevens recognizes that parental rights may themselves conflict, as they do in
Hodgson. If both parents have the "independent right" to control the upbringing of their
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In his opinion in Hodgson, Justice Stevens attempts to
explain and justify the Supreme Court's continuing constitu-
tional protection for the family using the traditional privacy
rationale. He argues that protection of the family unit as an
intermediate social institution is vital to the proper functioning
of a liberal democracy. Stevens then attempts to protect the
family on the ground that it is aprivate institution, however, and
in this regard his reasoning fails. Viewed, again in part, as an
institutional arm of the liberal state, the family can no longer be
understood as an inherently private entity. Stevens's ultimately
unsuccessful effort to ground constitutional protection for the
family in the concept of privacy nevertheless points the way to
an alternative constitutional standard, premised on a view of the
family as a public institution serving important political ends.
This alternative vision of the public family is the subject of Part
IV.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE OF FAMILY JUSTICE
The alternative theory of the family developed in this Part
challenges the traditional view of the private domestic sphere
that underlies the contemporary doctrine of constitutional pri-
vacy. This alternative view exists as a competing, subversive
strand within both family history and constitutional case law. It
argues that the modern family has never constituted a purely
private institution, but has always been subject to state regula-
tion and public control. This challenge to the received wisdom
concerning the private nature of family life focuses on the exten-
sive state involvement in the formation and structure of the fam-
ily as well as on the family's political role in both facilitating and
constraining governmental power.
children, and if this parental right includes the right to be informed of their daughter's
intention to terminate her pregnancy, then certainly both parents have the right to be so
informed. But, Stevens concludes, informing both parents intrudes on the right of family
privacy:
The second parent may well have an interest in the minor's abortion decision,
making full communication among all members of a family desirable in some
cases, but such communication may not be decreed by the State. The State has no
more interest in requiring all family members to talk with one another than it has
in requiring certain of them to live together.... [A] state interest in standardizing
its children and adults, making the "private realm of family life" conform to some
state-designed ideal, is not a legitimate state interest at all.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 452 (1990). Stevens thus uses the concept of family
privacy to uphold parental authority over children, then adopts that same concept to deny
that very authority to a second parent.
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This Part sets forth the general thesis of this alternative or
"public family" approach and seeks to use its insights to con-
struct a new constitutional understanding of the family.
Although the public family model views the family as an inher-
ently public institution, it does not, as some members of the cur-
rent Supreme Court now seem to believe, expose the family to
any form of reasonable state regulation. The institution of the
family stands at the constitutional crossroads of individual lib-
erty and political order; the family provides the conditions nec-
essary for the development of both the human and social
elements underlying our liberal democracy. As the foundation
for both individual liberty and structural security, the family
requires heightened constitutional attention. That attention
should take the form of a standard of family justice.
Subpart A sets forth the general public theory of the family.
By elaborating a general theory, I do not mean to suggest that
there exists a coherent body of work with which scholars either
do or would self-consciously identify. Instead, the theory out-
lined in subpart A is constructed from bits and pieces of
independent work that shares a common orientation toward the
public significance of the family. An understanding of the fam-
ily as a public institution does not accord with a single scholarly
approach or even a single political orientation, but accommo-
dates a broad range of theoretical and political agendas. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to distinguish between two general pub-
lic approaches to the role of the family in constitutional law:
conservative and progressive public family theories. These two
approaches and their significance for constitutional law are
explored in subparts B and C.
Subpart B examines the conservative approach as illus-
trated in the opinion of Justice Kennedy in Hodgson v. Minne-
sota. 14 This approach begins with the basic insight that family
140. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992),
Justice Kennedy joined a narrow majority of the Court in reaffirming Roe v. Wade's "essen-
tial holding," defined in part as "the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State." Id. at 2804.
Although Casey did not directly involve the issue of family privacy, it is arguable that the
joint opinion suggests that Kennedy has retreated somewhat from the extreme deference he
advocated in his opinion in Hodgson. Nevertheless, even if Kennedy has indicated some
movement away from that conservative public family position, the four dissenting Justices
in Casey remain firmly committed to it. See id. at 2855-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Thus, while the analysis presented here may no longer reflect the precise views of
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life has a public nature, but uses that insight as a basis for defer-
ring to the state's reasonable regulation of the family. Once hav-
ing declined to imply a "fundamental" right of family privacy,
Kennedy treats the question of constitutional review as being
decided. Because Kennedy views the family as having long been
the subject of public control, he concludes that family life lies
outside the realm of heightened constitutional protection.
Deprived of fundamental status, the family, in his view, is sub-
ject to reasonable state regulation.
The conservative approach is wrong, however, to conclude
that viewing the family as a public institution necessarily ends
the constitutional inquiry. To the contrary, this view of the pub-
lic family simply changes the constitutional focus. Instead of
focusing exclusively on the family's relation to the concept of
privacy, our attention should be turned to the role that the fam-
fly plays in maintaining our liberal democratic order. It may be,
as the conservative approach maintains, that the Constitution
offers no heightened protection for the family unit pursuant to a
notion of privacy rooted in the concept of negative liberty. 141
Accepting that premise, however, does not preclude constitu-
tional review of laws touching on family life to the extent that
those laws affect the family's more fundamental role in main-
taining the structure of government envisioned by the
Constitution. 142
Drawing on the family's role in maintaining our govern-
mental structure, subpart C presents a progressive approach sup-
ported by the work of a variety of legal and political scholars,
most notably theorists in the feminist tradition. This progressive
approach views the family, broadly defined, 143 as playing a cen-
tral and foundational role in preserving the social conditions
necessary for sustaining our liberal democracy. In this view,
parental authority in particular is necessary for the development
of responsible individuals who have been raised with a sense of
belonging to distinct and diverse moral traditions. Although
families facilitate the exercise of state power by raising children
to be responsible citizens, they also serve to constrain state
Justice Kennedy, those views may nevertheless now be shared by a near majority of the
Court.
141. This is not necessarily to suggest that the Constitution does not extend protec-
tion to a principle of individual autonomy that is independent of the family unit.
142. See infra notes 232-56 and accompanying text.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51.
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power by nurturing potential resistance to governmental
views.'" Families perform the vital function of creating citizens
committed to autonomous social traditions situated within a
broader common political life.
The progressive view recognizes that the family's role in
maintaining the human and social conditions necessary for our
political order is of central constitutional concern. In this view,
the Constitution can and should be read to require that state
laws affecting family life be carefully reviewed to determine
whether they threaten to undermine the family's essential role in
maintaining the liberal democratic structure on which our con-
stitutional order rests. Subpart C argues that this heightened
review should reflect a substantive vision of family life-a doc-
trine of family justice. This subpart further explores what con-
stitutional doctrine of family justice would mean and considers
how such a doctrine might have been applied in Hodgson.
A. The Family as a Public Institution
As described in Part I, traditional social history traces the
family's transformation from a pre-industrial extension of the
public community to a modern private entity set apart from the
public world of work and politics.1 45 That history also traces a
more recent movement from a family life of hierarchical author-
ity to an association of equal individuals.1 46 Central to this the-
ory is the liberal distinction between the realm of legitimate
public regulation and the realm of individual freedom, a distinc-
tion understood to mean the public world of work and politics
and the private world of family life. We have called this conven-
tional version of the separation between public and private
spheres of social life the public-domestic distinction. 47
This subpart challenges the generally accepted notion of the
private domestic sphere, and argues that, rather than having
undergone a transformation from public to private, the modern
family has experienced an increasing degree of public control.
Social and legal historians sharing this view assert that beneath
the ideology of family privacy lies a social and legal reality of
family regulation. These theorists ask why it is that, despite a
144. For a discussion of the limits on the authority of families to resist governmental
views, see infra text accompanying notes 257-61.
145. See supra notes 20-54 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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rhetoric of family privacy, "public involvement in the family
seems to have grown substantially during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries." 14 Their inquiry, although tentative and
incomplete, is nevertheless rigorous enough to challenge two pri-
mary assumptions of the conventional theory: first, that the
state is prohibited from interfering in family life; and second,
that the private sphere is confined to domestic affairs of no polit-
ical or civil significance. We shall briefly explore the challenge
to both of these assumptions.
Lee Teitelbaum has observed that "[t]he obvious analogue
in law to social discourse regarding the separation of public and
private spheres would be a diminution in direct regulation of the
private realm: that is, of the conduct of family members." 149
Family law scholars in the traditional mode endorse this "obvi-
ous analogue" by alluding to the increasing individualism of
family life as an illustration of the family's private nature.1 50
Teitelbaum challenges this connection between the rise of indi-
vidual autonomy and family privacy, arguing that individualism
has in fact brought greater state intervention into family life. By
examining the law of domestic relations in the post-Civil War
era, he documents the way in which
both public opinion and official action increasingly sought to
regulate directly various aspects of the formation and conduct
of domestic relations. Informal marriages were increasingly
disapproved and bureaucratic supervision installed; mental and
physical requirements for marriage came to be specified. Mini-
mal age requirements for marriage increased significantly.
During the same period, activities within the family were regu-
lated by laws making abortion at any stage criminal and by
prohibiting the distribution of information concerning contra-
ception. The revision of custody laws and the recognition of
adoption also did little to preserve a separate sphere or refuge.
Removing sole custodial authority from fathers may well have
destroyed a traditional element of patriarchy, but it also con-
verted a private (if patriarchal) system for decisionmaking into
a question of sound public policy. It became the business of
courts to determine the best interests of children, which in turn
148. Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1137.
149. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Legal History of the Family, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1052,
1062 (1987) (reviewing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985)).
150. See, e.g., GROSSBERG, supra note 20 (describing the liberalization of family life
in terms of the development of the "republican" family).
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meant that public agencies would decide what conduct and cir-
cumstances were desirable in child-rearing and what were not.
... One might add to these instances of public involve-
ment in the constitution and supervision of families the advent
of compulsory education and the juvenile court .... "I
Teitelbaum contends that even the heart of this private
sphere-the marital relationship itself-is subject to public con-
trol. He observes that, until recent years, entrance into and exit
from this civil status were subject to increasing restrictions based
on conventional morality. 152  Even today, those wishing to
marry are not entirely free to design their own contract, but
must accept the terms conferred on them by the state.1 5 3
The traditional theory acknowledges that the state plays a
limited role in the formation and dissolution of family life, but
argues that state regulation of this sort does not constitute inter-
vention into the private sphere. Instead, the state is understood
to be "defining" the boundaries between public and private
life.1 -4 Under the prevailing view, the boundaries of family life
are defined by reference to the preexisting, natural sphere of pri-
vate life. 155 In contrast, some scholars challenge the view that
151. Teitelbaum, supra note 149, at 1062-63; see also LASCH, supra note 27; Teitel-
baum, supra note 17, at 1147-63.
152. See Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1159.
153. Although parties do not create their own marriage contracts, in some states they
may alter, within limits, the nature of their marital status by way of a premarital contract.
Such contractual altering of spousal obligations does not extend to parental duties.
154. As Judith Stiehm observes:
In this country, intrafamily relationships are a private rather than a governmental
concern. The state does establish a legal basis for the family's existence, but this
defining function is exercised principally when families are either being founded,
as in marriage or adoption, or dissolved, as in divorce or death. Even then the
state's role is minimal unless property is involved.
Judith H. Stiehm, Government and the Family: Justice and Acceptance, in CHANGING
IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 361, 362 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979).
155. As Frances Olsen notes:
The idea that the state can intervene or not intervene in the family, and particu-
larly that the state practices a policy of nonintervention when it bolsters family
hierarchy, would seem to depend upon the belief that a natural family exists sepa-
rate from legal regulations, and that the hierarchy the state enforces is a natural
hierarchy, created by God or by nature, not by law.
Olsen, supra note 55, at 846.
In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977), the Supreme Court
expressed this conventional understanding of the natural family when it struck down what
it perceived to be the state's attempt to "slic[e] deeply into the family itself" by limiting the
definition of family too narrowly. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
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laws governing marriage and divorce merely outline the natural
sphere. "Rather than marking a boundary limiting state inter-
vention in the family, laws governing the family define the kinds
of families the state approves."' 15 6 From this point of view, state
laws setting qualifications for marriage and obligations on
divorce157 act as direct, substantive regulations of family life.
The public family approach has also illuminated the racial
and class dimensions of family regulation. To begin with, the
prevailing history of the family ignores the institution of slavery,
a regime that defined the black family out of legal existence.
[T]he history of the black family under slavery [cannot] be
ruled outside the bounds of the history of family law. The law
governed these families-and yet the law did not determine the
patterns of family life among slaves. Including the slave expe-
rience in the history of family law exposes state involvement in
internal family affairs. The law denied legal protection to the
affectionate bonds among blacks and enforced the power of
white men to dominate their wives, to sleep with slave women,
and to sire their children. 158
In challenging the traditional view, one historian points out
that, even after the Civil War, the freed family "exhibited a pref-
erence for work patterns typical of a 'traditional' rural society in
which religious, regional, and kinship loyalties are the dominant
values .... Indeed, very soon after emancipation emerged black
households-set within larger networks of kin and commu-
nity-that closely conformed to the 'premodern' family
model."'' 59 Finally, some social historians have traced the man-
ner in which public welfare laws have policed family life gener-
ally by subjecting those families that "deviate" from the
traditional norm to strict public control.16 0
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (noting that "the liberty interest in family
privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in
intrinsic human rights") (footnote omitted).
156. MiNow, supra note 57, at 276; see also Olsen, supra note 55, at 842 ("The state
defines the family and sets roles within the family; it is meaningless to talk about interven-
tion or nonintervention, because the state constantly defines and redefines the family and
adjusts and readjusts family roles.").
157. Most states require at a minimum that individuals qualify in terms of gender,
age, health, mental competency, and marital status. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 106.041
(1991). All states have laws regulating property distribution and alimony and child sup-
port obligations on divorce. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1993).
158. Minow, supra note 30, at 863.
159. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 68 (1985).
160. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WEL-
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The public family theory does not limit its critical inquiry
to direct state regulation of the family; it also identifies the myr-
iad ways in which the state has indirectly regulated the most
intimate aspects of family life. Martha Minow, applying the
insights of the legal realist movement, describes the way in
which the law indirectly aids in the construct of family
relationships:
Within a sphere cordoned off as "private," removed from state
intervention, family members remain individuals who have or
who lack rights to appeal to the state. Within the "private"
realm of the family, the law has always articulated rules about
relationships, and rules about when individuals may object to
the government about those relationships; historically, legal
theories excluded family relations, along with rules governing
those with decreased competence, from the reach of legal
rights. The law thus helped to shield from view the govern-
mental refusal to see some kinds of power or abuse as warrant-
ing public restraint. It would be false to say that family
relations were unregulated: they were regulated by the govern-
ment's grant of financial, physical, and social privileges to the
male head of household and refusal to hear any objections of
other family members.1 61
One example of the law's historical role in setting the terms
of family relationships is the marital exemption to rape stat-
utes. 162 Justified on the conventional ground of family privacy,
the marital rape exemption serves to reinforce oppressive and
discriminatory family roles.163 "[T]he marital rape exemption
clearly is rooted in an intention to deprive the married woman of
the protection of the state and to subject her to the will, sover-
eignty, and unchecked violence of her spouse."' 64 Marital rape
is but one illustration of the way in which the law, in areas as
diverse as criminal law, estate law, taxation, insurance law, labor
law, contract law, tort law, and property law, indirectly, but pro-
FARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); J. DONZELOT, THE
POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979).
161. MINOW, supra note 57, at 279 (footnote omitted).
162. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45 (1990); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital
Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1987).
163. Although the marital rape exemption has been eliminated in a few states, the
majority continue to provide lesser penalties for spousal rape. See West, supra note 166, at
46. Many states have extended this more lenient treatment to cohabitant and acquaintance
rape. See Note, supra note 162, at 1260.
164. West, supra note 162, at 65.
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foundly, affects the structure of family life.165
The public nature of family life is evidenced not simply by
the degree of state intervention into family affairs, but also by
the public role played by women within the domestic sphere.
Although historians generally agree that the nineteenth-century
family underwent a transformation from a socially integrated to
a socially segregated sphere, they dispute the meaning of the
"cult of domesticity" that came to define family life at that
time. 166 Whereas scholars have traditionally viewed this domes-
ticity in privacy terms, family and women's historians have
explored the political significance of the women's sphere of
domesticity and the place of this newly domesticated mother in
political life. Some scholars have examined the role of the
"republican mother," whose primary responsibility was to
"mold[ ] the nation's young into virtuous republicans and com-
petent burghers." 167 As Professor Kerber describes:
The Republican Mother's life was dedicated to the service of
civic virtue: she educated her sons for it, she condemned and
corrected her husband's lapses from it. If, according to [one]
commonly accepted claim, the stability of the nation rested on
the persistence of virtue among its citizens, then the creation of
virtuous citizens was dependent on the presence of wives and
mothers who were well informed, "properly methodical," and
free of "invidious and rancorous passions." It was perhaps
more than mere coincidence that virtil was derived from the
Latin word for man, with its connotations of virility. Political
action seemed somehow inherently masculine. Virtue in a
woman seemed to require another theatre for its display. To
that end the theorists created a mother who had a political pur-
pose and argued that her domestic behavior had a direct polit-
165. One commentator has noted:
[Tihe involvement of the law in family life reaches into widely diverse areas of
law, well beyond what is usually labeled as juvenile and family law. For example,
labor law is apt to have consequences in terms of family roles, such as who may
serve as a breadwinner, the amount of time available for family life, and even the
safety of the home.... [S]uch disparate areas of law as estate law, insurance law,
taxation, and land use policy may do more to structure families than family law
per se.
Gary B. Melton, Parents, Children and the Courts: The Significance ofLaw in the Everyday
Lives of Children and Families, 22 GA. L. REv. 851, 862-63 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see
also Stiehm, supra note 154, at 362-63.
166. See Cor, supra note 18, at 1.
167. GROSSBERG, supra note 20, at 8.
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ical function in the Republic. 16
Historians such as Kerber emphasize the directly political role
these women played in their domestic capacity as the guardians
of future citizens.
The ideology of the republican mother has led some social
and legal historians to explore the ways in which women's
"domestic" work has not been limited to matters of purely pri-
vate concern. 169 Although operating under an ideology of sepa-
rate spheres, women historically have drawn on their perceived
expertise in matters of morality to enter the public sphere.
Martha Minow describes the significance of the "vast numbers"
of women who engaged in philanthropic and social reform dur-
ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:
An examination of the work of women in benevolent, religious,
social, and political organizations provides a challenge to both
parts of the traditional story of family legal history: it suggests
that women were never confined to a domestic sphere as nar-
row or dependent as the ideology implied; and, it also demon-
strates that at least some women tried to usher in a new social
order characterized not by autonomous individualism but by
collective and connective social relations. Critical to both the
women who invented these activities and the men who wit-
nessed them, was the rhetorical power of women's traditional
domestic roles in justifying the extension of nurturing and care-
taking functions-and their presumed purity and virtue-to a
public audience.' 70
In their role as spiritual caretakers for the polity, women
brought the affective values of the domestic sphere into public
life. Under the mantle of the "cult of domesticity," they infused
public life with the values of the so-called private family; and
under the mantle of republican ideology, they infused family life
with a public spirit.
The public family theory should be understood to operate
on a normative as well as a descriptive level. Contemporary lib-
eralism conceives of the private domestic sphere as the realm
where individuals are free to maximize their own welfare. Some
theorists have challenged this liberal image of human nature on
168. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY
IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 229 (1986).
169. Working class women have always, of course, directly contradicted the notion
that women are destined for the private life of marriage and children. See Minow, supra
note 30, at 852-57.
170. Id. at 877-78.
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the ground that it fails to offer either a descriptively accurate or
a normatively desirable account of family life. In their view, the
liberal conception of abstract individualism, under which indi-
viduals interact as independent, autonomous, rational equals,
has no connection to family life, where individuals are, above all,
dependent, related, and unequal. The ontology of liberal indi-
vidualism, the source of liberal rights, simply does not apply to
family life.1 71 In families we are, before all else, related; and in
this view, those relations are affected with the public interest.
The view of the family as an institution of public signifi-
cance has its own, admittedly subordinate, history in Supreme
Court decisions. In contrast to the traditional understanding of
family privacy, which locates its origins in the 1923 decision in
Meyer v. Nebraska,72 the doctrinal origins of the public family
approach extend even earlier to the 1879 decision in Reynolds v.
United States.173 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld a law
prohibiting polygamy on the ground that the state had the law-
ful power to regulate marriage. The Court described the state's
interest in regulating marriage in terms of the interrelationship
between familial and political order:
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nev-
ertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually
regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and
out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations
and duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous mar-
riages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the gov-
ernment of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests....
[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,... which, when
applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary
despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection
with monogamy.... [T]here cannot be a doubt that.., it is
within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil govern-
f
171. Robin West takes this point even further by arguing that it does not apply to
women at all. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. Rnv. 1, 14 (1988)
("The potential for material connection with the other defines women's subjective, phenom-
enological and existential state, just as surely as the inevitability of material separation from
the other defines men's existential state.").
172. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra text accompanying notes 42-47. Meyer can also
be read to support the public family view to the extent that implicit in Meyer's conception
of parental authority over children's education is the political aim of preparing responsible
citizens.
173. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). For a discussion of Reynolds, see Minow, supra note 33, at
967-70; Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1160.
[Vol. 671004
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
ment to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be
the law of social life under its dominion. 17 4
Because "polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle," the
state has a legitimate interest in regulating family life; the family
itself is intimately connected to the structure of political life.
The Court reiterated this view nine years later, in Maynard v.
Hill, when it noted that "[m]arriage, as creating the most impor-
tant relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution, has always
been subject to the control of the legislature."' 5 In Maynard,
the Court rejected the view of marriage as a private, contractual
arrangement:
The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties
to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply inter-
ested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization nor progress.' 76
Central to both Reynolds and Maynard is the belief that the fam-
ily plays a crucial role in the structure of our social and political
order, and that state regulation of family life is necessary to pre-
serve that order.
Although overshadowed by the traditional conception of
family privacy, the Supreme Court has never wholly abandoned
its approval of state regulation of family life. Justice Harlan
gave voice to this competing tradition of family regulation in his
1961 dissent from Poe v. Ullman:17
[The] inclusion of the category of morality among state con-
cerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to
the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally
concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well.
Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that
which is purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw
from community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual
powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which
children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding
adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express
174. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.66.
175. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
176. Id. at 211.
177. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance
of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area
must build upon that basis.1 7 1
In sharp contrast to the traditional view, Harlan articulates a
conception of the state's role in legislating the morality of family
life. Although Harlan does not, as earlier cases did, justify the
state's interest by appealing to the interconnection between state
and family order, he does establish a firm basis of judicial defer-
ence to justify upholding such state regulations. Because those
laws are "so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life,"
he argues, any attempt to uproot them would destroy the social
order.
A recognition of the state's legitimate role in regulating pri-
vate morality has emerged in Supreme Court decisions with
increasing frequency in recent years. In contrast to the Court's
traditional commitment to family privacy, this emerging view
focuses instead on the tradition of state regulation of family life
and morals, and exhibits a strong deference to family tradition.
Illustrative of the Supreme Court's growing deference to family
tradition are the two recent decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick 179
and Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,18o both of which reveal the Court's
increasing reliance on community tradition as the touchstone of
constitutional rights.
Upholding a prohibition on homosexual sodomy, the
Supreme Court in Bowers examined the history of homosexual
sodomy at common law and in state statutes, finding that
178. Id. at 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Ironically, Harlan's dissent in Ullman is
best known for its articulation of the principle of marital privacy, which became the hold-
ing of the Court four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See
supra text accompanying notes 40-41. In Ullman, Harlan concluded that a ban against
contraceptive use by married couples violated the fundamental right of marital privacy.
Ultimately, he makes clear that his concept of family privacy is defined by social and polit-
ical tradition:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State
not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and pro-
tected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-
marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it under-
takes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.
Ullman, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
179. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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"[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots,"181 and
concluding that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct
is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, face-
tious. ' ' 18 2 The Court rejected the conventional commitment to
family privacy by reasoning that "it would be difficult, except by
fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leav-
ing exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual
crimes even though they are committed in the home. We are
unwilling to start down that road." 1 83 The Court concluded by
explaining that its reluctance was based on the view that the
morality of family life is a legitimate object of state concern.
Law "is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed."18 4
Similarly, in Michael H., a plurality of the Court upheld an
irrebuttable presumption of paternity that effectively precluded a
biological father from pursuing an already established relation-
ship with his daughter. The plurality held that, because the
mother was married to another man, the state was free to decide
to protect the marital unit at the expense of the natural father's
relationship with his daughter.18 5 Justice Scalia, writing for a
plurality, held that the Due Process Clause only covers those
interests "traditionally protected by our society," those " 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.' "18 Tradition in this view, of course, is
the tradition of community morality. "The family unit accorded
traditional respect in our society.., is typified, of course, by the
181. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
182. Id at 194 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
183. Id. at 195-96.
184. Id. at 196. In contrast, Justice Blackmun in his dissent viewed the case as
involving the negative "'right to be let alone.'" Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Blackmun rejected the use of tradition as a source for constitutional rights. See id. at 210
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has
held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation
from this Court's scrutiny.").
185. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
186. Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo,
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marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried
parents and their children."1 8 7 After reviewing the history of
paternity at common law and in state statutes, Scalia concluded
that there is no tradition awarding parental rights to a biological
father and a mother married to another man."' Justice Scalia's
holding clarifies that, under the conservative view, family pri-
vacy, if it exists at all, exists only at the will of the state.18 9
Under the interpretation of constitutional liberty articulated in
both Bowers and Michael H., family privacy is no longer a pre-
political right against state power, but a right conferred by state
power. In contrast to the natural law leanings of the traditional
approach, the public family model rests on a firm positivist foun-
dation. Although the family under the conservative approach is
a public institution to the extent that it is shaped by community
values, it is not governed by principles derived from a textual or
moral authority transcending majoritarian politics.
By identifying the family as an institution of public signifi-
cance, the Supreme Court appears to remove it from the private
sphere of negative liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution. In so doing, the Court absolves itself of
responsibility for the lives of individuals within the domestic
sphere. As we shall see in the following subpart, the conserva-
tive approach views that responsibility as lying with the political
branch of state government.
B. Family Tradition
In helping to fashion an emerging constitutional deference
to family tradition, Justice Kennedy distinguishes his approach
187. Id. at 124 n.3.
188. Id. at 125-26.
189. Justice Scalia states:
We do not accept Justice Brennan's criticism that this result "squashes" the lib-
erty that consists of "the freedom not to conform." It seems to us that reflects the
erroneous view that there is only one side to this controversy-that one disposi-
tion can expand a "liberty" of sorts without contracting an equivalent "liberty"
on the other side. Such a happy choice is rarely available. Here, to provide pro-
tection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father,
and vice versa. If [the natural father] has a "freedom not to conform" (whatever
that means), [the marital father] must equivalently have a "freedom to conform."
One of them will pay a price for asserting that "freedom"-[the natural father] by
being unable to act as father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or [the
marital father] by being unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional family
unit he and [the child] have established. Our disposition does not choose between
these two "freedoms," but leaves that to the people of California.
Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
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in Hodgson v. Minnesota 190 from the conventional doctrine of
family privacy in two important ways. First, he adopts the alter-
native view of the family as an institution of public significance
and, therefore, subject to legitimate public regulation. Second,
based on this insight, he withdraws constitutional jurisdiction
over the family in deference to the state prerogative to legislate
morality in this public domestic sphere.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion in Hodgson does not
specifically articulate the public vision of the family, it adopts an
approach consistent with the view that the family is an institu-
tion of public significance.19  For Kennedy, family life is a
moral realm shaped by "[t]he history and culture of Western
civilization."' 192 In contrast to Justice Stevens's charter of nega-
tive liberties, Kennedy's Constitution embraces the state's
enforcement of traditional family norms and values. For Ken-
nedy, parental notification is a legitimate governmental end pre-
cisely because the community has a special role to play in
shaping the morals and values surrounding the domestic sphere.
The right "to be let alone"-a right associated with the private
sphere of negative liberty-is not a part of this traditional family
life.
Kennedy directly attacks Stevens for rejecting the state's
interest in regulating family life. As discussed earlier, 193 for Ste-
vens, the state has no legitimate role to play in legislating family
values because the family constitutes the realm of private liberty.
In his view, the constitutional right of individual autonomy pro-
tects the individual's freedom from the oppressive conformity of
community life. In contrast, Kennedy maintains that state
involvement in family life is a legitimate governmental end:
The State identifies two interests served by the law. The
first is the State's interest in the welfare of pregnant minors.
190. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
191. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia. See id. at 480 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although he dissented from the majority's holding that two-parent notification standing
alone is unconstitutional, Kennedy voted with a different majority of the Court in uphold-
ing two-parent notification where judicial bypass is provided. Compare id. at 489 with id.
at 497. Justice O'Connor, who had joined Stevens in concluding that two-parent notifica-
tion standing alone is unconstitutional, provided the swing vote on the issue of parental
notification with judicial bypass. Compare id. at 459-60 with id. at 461 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
192. Id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
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The second is the State's interest in acknowledging and pro-
moting the role of parents in the care and upbringing of their
children. Justice Stevens, writing for two Members of the
Court, acknowledges the legitimacy of the first interest, but
decides that the second interest is somehow illegitimate, at least
as to whichever parent a minor chooses not to notify. I cannot
agree that the Constitution prevents a State from keeping both
parents informed of the medical condition or medical treat-
ment of their child under the terms and conditions of this
statute. 194
For Kennedy, family life is not about freedom from the commu-
nity but about roles defined by community tradition.
The different approaches taken by Stevens and Kennedy
entail very different constitutional standards for reviewing state
laws affecting family life. Stevens would review such laws on the
ground that the constitutional guarantee of family privacy pre-
vents the government from intervening in family life absent com-
pelling reasons. Kennedy's view does not impose any significant
constraints on government action. Laws affecting the family will
be struck down only if they transgress the traditional protections
accorded family life. Although Kennedy's approach offers some
minimal critical basis on which to evaluate governmental action,
the standard in fact only requires that government adhere to
"tradition." 195
Kennedy explores the contours of this community tradition
in his consideration of the state interests underlying the parental
notification statute. 196 With regard to the state's interest in the
welfare of the child, for example, Kennedy does not adopt the
individualistic "incompetency" model articulated by Stevens.
As we have seen, 197 Stevens justifies limited state involvement in
194. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 482 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
195. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (noting
that the "purpose [of the tradition standard] is to prevent future generations from lightly
casting aside important traditional values").
196. From the outset, Kennedy adopts a rhetorical style that is at odds with the
liberal language of individual rights. In contrast to Stevens's focus on the minor's liberty
interest, Kennedy does not identify the pregnant minor's interest nor does he articulate the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied in this case. He upholds the notification provi-
sion, however, on the ground that it constitutes a "reasonable measure," see Hodgson, 497
U.S. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which suggests that he
believes that the liberty interest is insufficient to raise the minimal level of scrutiny. Having
devalued the pregnant minor's constitutional interest, Kennedy focuses his argument on
the identification of legitimate state interests.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
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the family on the ground that pregnant minors are full rights-
bearing individuals whose immaturity impairs their ability to
exercise those rights in a rational way. In contrast, Kennedy
views children as occupying a special status under the law. He
does not portray children as the free and autonomous members
of the liberal universe. Instead, children possess "qualitative dif-
ferences" from adult individuals:
The law does not give to children many rights given to adults,
and provides, in general, that children can exercise the rights
they do have only through and with parental consent. Legisla-
tures historically have acted on the basis of the qualitative dif-
ferences in maturity between children and adults, and not
without reason. Age is a rough but fair approximation of
maturity and judgment, and a State has an interest in seeing
that a child, when confronted with serious decisions such as
whether or not to abort a pregnancy, has the assistance of her
parents in making the choice. 9
Although Kennedy does not abandon the rhetoric of rights,
he views those rights through the prism of family relations.
Whereas Stevens emphasizes the pregnant minor's right to indi-
vidual privacy, Kennedy emphasizes her dependence and the
"grave decision" she must make. Whereas Stevens views the
pregnant minor as a young adult, Kennedy clearly views her as a
child defined primarily by her dependent status within the fam-
ily. In Kennedy's opinion, she is not the abstract individual of
liberal thought; instead, she is "' "a girl of tender years, under
emotional stress, . . . ill-equipped to make [the decision whether
to bear a child] without mature advice and emotional
support." ' "199
For Kennedy, family tradition establishes a set of hierarchi-
cal relationships built around an image of loving authority and
dependence. The individuals inhabiting the domestic sphere are
not abstract, independent or equal, but are intimately connected
in relationships defined by age and gender. Under this
approach, family life remains governed by a community tradi-
tion reflecting the domestic virtues of love, altruism and depen-
dency. In this realm where individuals are presumed to act out
198. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 482 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 480 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979) (plurality opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
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of love, children exist as dependent individuals needing the
"mature advice and emotional support" 200 only parents can
provide.
The rhetoric of family tradition that permeates Kennedy's
opinion is most forceful in his consideration of the state's inter-
est in promoting parental rights. Kennedy begins that discus-
sion by describing the rights accorded parents under the
common law. He notes that, although the common law histori-
cally gave fathers the right to the custody and control of their
children, "the common law of most States has abandoned the
idea that parental rights are vested solely in fathers, with
mothers being viewed merely as agents of their husbands; it is
now the case that each parent has parental rights and parental
responsibilities. ' 20 1 Kennedy validates this common-law tradi-
tion by appealing to a more substantial one: "'The history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of paren-
tal concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their chil-
dren is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.' "202 Thus, the combined traditions of the common
law, Western civilization and American society express a com-
mon recognition "'that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.' "203 The tradition of parental rights he
describes here is a tradition derived from the community's social
and legal norms.
The tradition of parental rights invoked by Kennedy is
clearly antithetical to the conception of family privacy set forth
by Stevens. Kennedy appeals to "the history and culture of
Western civilization" to support his view that the domestic
sphere of family relationships is not a private arena insulated
from state scrutiny, but a sphere defined and limited by commu-
200. See id
201. Id. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted). It is fitting that Kennedy chooses to rely on a common-law tradition favoring the
authority of fathers in support of a two-parent notification statute. Because pregnant
minors under a one-parent rule overwhelmingly choose to notify their mothers, the practi-
cal effect of the two-parent requirement is to enforce the authority of fathers within the
family.
202. Id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).
203. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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nity values and traditions. Kennedy concludes that "[a] State
pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it attempts
to foster and preserve the parent-child relation by giving all par-
ents the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of
their children." 2" In his view, the Hodgson majority improperly
rejects the state's interest in strengthening family relationships.
Kennedy attacks Stevens for describing as "constitutional[ly]
irrelevan[t] ' ' 20 5 what Kennedy views as the state's legitimate
interest "in acknowledging and promoting the role of parents in
the care and upbringing of their children, ' 20 6 and in
"promot[ing] the primacy of the family tie."2 °7 The tradition
that Kennedy espouses is a tradition of state involvement in the
domestic sphere.
For Kennedy, the Hodgson case implicates the commu-
nity's right to legislate in the sphere of family relations.
Whereas Stevens views the parental notification statute as facili-
tating the minor's individual right of privacy, Kennedy explicitly
understands the provision as a regulation of substantive ends, a
direct endorsement of family values by the state. In response to
Stevens's conclusion that the state has no legitimate interest in
promoting family relations, Kennedy retorts that "[tihis conclu-
sion, which no doubt will come as a surprise to most parents, is
incompatible with our constitutional tradition and any accepta-
ble notion of judicial review of legislative enactments." 20
For Kennedy, the Court fulfills its legitimate role when it
defers to the community tradition surrounding family life.
Although he holds that "parents have a liberty interest, pro-
tected by the Constitution, in having a reasonable opportunity to
develop close relations with their children," 20 9 the liberty inter-
est he identifies retains only the slightest vestiges of the modem
liberal conception of negative liberty espoused by Stevens. Ken-
nedy makes no promises that parents will be "let alone" to raise
their children. Instead, his view would limit parental rights to
the "opportunity to develop close relations with their chil-
dren. ' 210 The community is free to legislate the parental role so
204. Id.
205. See id. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Id. at 482 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. Id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id.
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long as it accords parents the traditional opportunity to develop
a relationship with a biological child.
In Kennedy's view the state is thus constitutionally
required to provide biological parents with the opportunity to
develop a relationship with their offspring, but it is not prohib-
ited from doing more. The Constitution is not a ceiling on the
state's legitimate authority to regulate family life, but its
foundation:
[T]he fact that the Constitution does not protect the parent-
child relationship in all circumstances does not mean that the
State cannot attempt to foster parental participation where the
Constitution does not demand that it do so. A State may seek
to protect and facilitate the parent-child bond on the assump-
tion that parents will act in their child's best interests.2"
Kennedy does not view the state's "facilitation" of the parental
role as depriving the parents of any constitutional interest
because they are not thereby deprived of the opportunity to
develop a relationship with their children. The fact that state
facilitation of the parental role naturally involves the enforce-
ment of family values does not pose a constitutional problem for
Kennedy. "[I]t is at least permissible for a State to legislate on
the premise that parents, as a general rule, are interested in their
children's welfare and will act in accord with it."'212
Kennedy is sensitive to the charge that state regulation of
family values raises the specter of governmental tyranny by forc-
ing families "to conform to the State's archetype of the ideal
family. ' 213 He responds by arguing that parental notification
does not require conformity to the community's vision of the
good family life, because "[h]ow the family responds to such
notice is, for the most part, beyond the State's control. ' 21 4 All
that the state has done, in Kennedy's view, is "make the commu-
nication [between parent and child] possible by at least inform-
ing parents of their daughter's intentions. ' 215 In other words, he
views notification as simply providing the procedural means for
communication, and not coerced communication itself:
Minnesota has done no more than act upon the common-
sense proposition that, in assisting their daughter in deciding
211. Id.
212. Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. (quoting id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
214. Id
215. Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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whether to have an abortion, parents can best fulfill their roles
if they have the same information about their own child's medi-
cal condition and medical choices as the child's doctor does;
and that to deny parents this knowledge is to risk, or perpetu-
ate, estrangement or alienation from the child when she is in
the greatest need of parental guidance and support. The Court
does the State, and our constitutional tradition, sad disservice
by impugning the legitimacy of these elemental objectives.216
In Kennedy's view, parental notification is legislation compelling
the means of good family life, not its ends. To the extent that
parental notification gives individuals the tools with which to be
good parents, it is freedom-inducing rather than freedom-
restricting.
Kennedy relies on the means-ends distinction in an effort to
avoid the specter of state compulsion; he does not, however,
intend to repudiate the notion that it is appropriate for the state
to proceed on the assumption "that parents will act in their
child's best interests."217 As we have seen, Kennedy adheres to a
vision of the state's proper role in promoting the good family
life, but he asserts that legislation of family values does mean
compelled conformity to those values. By retaining a healthy
liberal respect for individual freedom, Kennedy suggests that
legislation of family values should reflect gentle persuasion, not
hard coercion.
Kennedy's aversion to moral coercion highlights what is at
stake behind his commitment to community tradition. The tra-
dition to which he appeals is a tradition respecting individual
liberty. Like Stevens, Kennedy is committed to a conception of
individual sovereignty and autonomy in family life. Where Ken-
nedy parts from his conventional colleagues, however, is in
accepting the state's affirmative role in maintaining individual
freedom in the domestic sphere. In Kennedy's view, although
the Constitution does not require the state to protect affirmative
liberties by providing parents with the means for effective enjoy-
ment of their parental rights, the Constitution also does not pro-
hibit states from doing so. For Kennedy, "our constitutional
tradition" tolerates but does not require affirmative rights within
the family. Kennedy concludes that the parental notification
statute, and the "constitutional tradition" that supports it, is not
oppressive of individual liberty because it does not require fami-
216. Id.
217. Id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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lies to conform to the state's image of the good family.218 The
means-ends distinction ultimately is important as a way for Ken-
nedy to show that the state is simply facilitating rather than
compromising the affirmative right to parental authority when it
legislates a normative ideal of family life.
Kennedy's conservative approach ultimately fails as a the-
ory of constitutional liberty because it perceives the family as
subject to legislative, but not constitutional, oversight. He
presumes that, because the family is subject to governmental and
social legislation, it is not within the realm of negative liberty
protected under the Due Process Clause. Whatever claim the
family might make for constitutional protection must be pre-
mised on a state legal tradition clearly extending such protec-
tion. Although Kennedy's approach arguably leaves some
constitutional basis from which to challenge current state laws
that deviate from such tradition, it is still a profoundly deferen-
tial approach that simply requires states to provide plausible rea-
sons for changing their legislative minds. Kennedy's deferential
approach provides no critical basis from which to evaluate the
results of majoritarian decision making.
Kennedy's mistake follows from his assumption that the
constitutional issue begins and ends with the determination that
family life does not transcend majoritarian politics. The follow-
ing subpart argues that, given the family's fundamental role in
our political scheme, the Constitution's structural provisions
should be read to guarantee that state laws will promote a family
life consistent with that political order. The republican mother
of the Revolutionary era, raising her virtuous sons to participate
in the civic pursuit of the common good, has become the liberal
parent of the twentieth century, raising his or her sons and
daughters to be responsible individuals capable of contributing
to the political life of the community. The modem parent car-
ries the political responsibility of instilling a commitment to jus-
tice in her developing children.
C. Family Justice
The constitutional dilemma posed here is disarmingly sim-
ple. At the same time that family privacy preserves a loving ref-
218. Kennedy bases this conclusion on the argument that "[h]ow the family unit
responds to such notice is, for the most part, beyond the State's control." Id. at 485 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, he ignores the extent to
which communication of the daughter's intentions is itself a coercive practice.
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uge of individual freedom, it also shields domestic abuse and
inequality from public redress. It was in recognition of this
oppressive aspect of family privacy that the constitutional prin-
ciple of individual autonomy pierced the domestic sphere. Yet
as we have seen,219 the right of individual privacy threatens to
destroy the private bonds of family life by elevating individual
rights above communal needs. Thus, it would seem that consti-
tutional law must settle for either a private family or autono-
mous individuals, but not both. What the Supreme Court has
settled for instead, in the form of judicial deference, is neither.
The Court's emerging conservative approach declines to protect
any form of privacy in deference to state traditions.
By examining the recent work of feminist historians and
theorists, this section explores the possibility of preserving indi-
vidual autonomy without sacrificing the distinct virtues of fam-
ily life. Until recently, the modem feminist movement has
focused on the way in which family privacy has traditionally
reinforced the oppression of women and children in the domestic
sphere.2 20 Sharing this insight into family life, these feminists
fall into two general categories: liberal feminists who have
sought to reform family life in an effort to improve conditions
for women in the traditional domestic sphere, and radical femi-
nists who have sought to eliminate the domestic sphere alto-
gether. For both liberal and radical feminists, the solution to the
problems of domestic life is to eradicate either the inequality or
the subordination of women. In either case, the strategy focuses
on doing away with what is pernicious in family life, including, if
need be, the private family itself.
This Article offers an alternative understanding of both the
domestic disease and the constitutional cure. Drawing on the
affirmative aspects of family life, the theory offered here seeks
not to eradicate, but to rehabilitate: it asks not what is wrong
with family life, but how the family may measure up to what is
right. This theory proceeds from the understanding that the
constitutional doctrine of family privacy went wrong not
because it recognized the family as a sphere governed by the pri-
219. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80 (discussing Roe).
220. See MINOW, supra note 57, at 271-72; ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYR-
ANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 182-200 (1987) ("[lIt is precisely family values that contemporary
politicians so much affirm that permit, encourage, and serve to maintain domestic
violence.").
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vate virtue of loving authority, but because it failed to recognize
the family as a sphere of justice as well. After reviewing the
limitations of the liberal and radical viewpoints within feminism,
this subpart outlines the constitutional implications of the alter-
native theory of family justice proposed here.
1. Public and Private in Feminist Thought
The concept of family privacy derives from the fundamental
liberal distinction between the public sphere of government reg-
ulation and the private sphere of individual liberty.221 As a cen-
tral ideological determinant of women's status in social and
political life, the public-private distinction has in recent years
become a primary focus of feminist inquiry. As one feminist
scholar has noted, "[t]he dichotomy between the private and the
public is central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and
political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is
about. ' 222 At its most basic level, feminism challenges the
notion that the status of women within the domestic sphere is
irrelevant to our political life. Rejecting the "separate but
equal" theory of women's domestic role, feminism politicizes the
private sphere in order to extend the principles of justice and
equality to family life. The salient and divisive question for fem-
inists is how to realize these political principles in a manner that
is consistent with feminist values. The differing answers that
feminists give to that question tell a story all their own. Let us
briefly recount it.
The liberal movement for women's equality, which first
coined the phrase "the personal is political" in the early 1960s,
finds its roots in the nineteenth century women's suffrage move-
ment.223 That movement, spawned by the 1848 Woman's Rights
Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, sought equality for
women by demanding equal social and political rights.224 The
movement also focused on extending individual rights to the
domestic sphere. "[Early] feminism's contribution to liberalism
was to reinforce and greatly expand the individual's zone of pri-
221. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
222. PATEMAN, supra note 1, at 118.
223. See generally 1-2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth C. Stanton et al.
eds., Rochester, N.Y., Fowler & Wells 1881-1882), reprinted in THE FEMINIST PAPERS,
supra note 60, at 413.
224. See, e.g., 1 id. at 70-74, reprinted in THE FEMINIST PAPERS, supra note 60, at
415-21 ("Declaration of Sentiments").
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vacy-to widen the definition of rights beyond the rights of the
individual in his civil status to include the rights of the individ-
ual in her private capacity. ' 225 The twentieth-century women's
rights movement adopted this earlier rights-oriented agenda as
part of an effort to reform the liberal regime. Modem liberal
feminism is committed to preserving a sphere of private activity
that is free from governmental control. Aware, however, of the
threat that family life poses to individual autonomy, this strand
of feminism seeks to extend the liberal principle of individual
self-government to the domestic sphere. Liberal feminists wish
to retain the categories of public and private, but render them
gender-neutral.
In the constitutional arena, the doctrine of individual pri-
vacy reflects the success of the liberal feminist agenda. As we
have seen,226 individual privacy views the family as an institution
that has shielded private abuse from the public view. The doc-
trine of individual privacy posits the individual-whether male
or female-as the limit of legitimate governmental regulation.227
But, as we have also seen, the doctrine of individual privacy pro-
tects individual freedom at the cost of severing the traditional
familial bonds of loving authority.228 Under the doctrine of indi-
vidual privacy, the state has a basis from which it may penetrate
the intimate family unit. Although liberal feminism preserves
the value of individual autonomy, a condition previously denied
to women, it nevertheless sacrifices the domestic virtues of altru-
ism, love and dependence. The public-private distinction is
retained, but the virtues of family life are lost.
A more radical strand of feminism challenges the notion
that any sphere of social life, whether individual or familial, is
free from political significance. For radical feminists, the core
arena of liberal feminism's individual privacy-the arena of sex-
uality-is the source of women's social and political oppres-
sion.229  Their view rejects the public-private distinction
altogether; instead, "every area of life is the sphere of 'sexual
225. Clark, supra note 59, at 906.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64, 161-65.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82 (discussing Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
229. See JAGGAR, supra note 17, at 85 (describing how radical feminism expresses the
"profound insight... that distinctions of gender, based on sex, structure virtually every
aspect of our lives and indeed are so all-pervasive that ordinarily they go quite
unrecognized").
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politics.' ",230 For radical feminists, women's equality demands
public attention to the most intimate aspects of women's lives.
It requires an affirmative commitment to recognizing and elimi-
nating women's subordination in every area of life, including
that of personal relations. For radical feminists, the concept of
privacy is itself a dangerous tool of gender oppression, shielding
private abuse from social view.
Against a background of liberal and radical feminism, this
Article offers an alternative, progressive reconception of the rela-
tionship between the family and the state. Like the radical femi-
nist view, this progressive approach locates the source of
women's domestic oppression in the traditional concept of pri-
vacy. Progressive feminism rejects the conventional liberal
understanding of the public-private distinction and in particular
the view of the private domestic sphere as a realm of negative
liberty. Instead, the progressive approach conceives of the
domestic sphere as a realm constructed by public values and
governed by public principles. Yet unlike the radical view, the
progressive approach does not seek to eliminate family life, but
rather to redeem it.
Ultimately, any progressive approach in support of the fam-
ily must defend itself against the charge that the family is an
inherently conservative institution resistant to social change.
Proponents of this charge might ask why a progressive approach
should endorse an institution long associated with oppressive
social roles. One answer is pragmatic: the family is so deeply
embedded in our social and legal fabric that its reform seems a
more likely strategy to succeed than its elimination. A related
answer resonates on both a personal and normative level: the
family, however historically oppressive, is also the source of
much human pleasure and happiness.231 Most of us value our
families, whatever their unique problems. While the closed
230. Id. at 101. See generally KATE MILLETr, SEXUAL POLrrIcs (1970).
231. Many people share a similar response to the argument that gender equality
requires doing away with gender difference. In her review of Susan Okin's book, Justice,
Gender and the Family, OKIN, supra note 1, Martha Nussbaum comments:
[T]he sense of being male or female is so strong in most of us that a richer psycho-
logical and historical inquiry into the nature of human desire would be needed in
order to make the case for the kind of [genderless] society Okin seems to
want.... I sympathize intellectually with Okin's views, but I can't see myself in
the world she projects; and I find myself wishing that she were not so fond of
making simple and unambiguous statements about matters that are deeply ambig-
uous and mysterious.
Martha Nussbaum, Justice for Womenl, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 8, 1992, at 43, 46.
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doors of the home have shielded abuse, isolation and exploita-
tion, they have at the same time nurtured love and commitment.
It is the goal of progressive theory to redeem the family by build-
ing upon its particular and compelling virtues.
Progressive feminism is not about freedom from govern-
ment control, but is rather an affirmative vision of personal and
family life. From its perspective, constructing is a public-and
ultimately, constitutional-responsibility.
2. A Progressive Approach to the Public Family
The progressive approach set forth in this Article accords
with the understanding of the family as an institution of funda-
mental political significance. Although sharing a vision of the
public family, the progressive approach rejects the Supreme
Court's reasoning that, because family life is a matter of public
interest, the Court must defer to the political process. Instead,
this Article suggests that the Court should evaluate laws affect-
ing family life in light of the family's foundational role in our
political order.
The Constitution establishes a governmental structure
defined by the general principles of federalism, separation of
powers, and legislative representation. Specific textual provi-
sions establish a federal government of divided powers232 within
a federal system of dual sovereignties.3 3 The Constitution's pro-
visions require congressional elections at the federal level,234 and
a republican form of government at the state level.235 Demo-
cratic self-government lies at the heart of the Constitution's
structural guarantees.236 The Constitution thus assumes the
existence of a citizenry that is willing and able to participate in a
representative democracy, and it is the Supreme Court's role to
review state laws to ensure their consistency with these struc-
tural guarantees.
For a liberal democracy to succeed, however, it is not
enough that individuals merely have the competence to cast a
vote. Rather, as Jean Elshtain observes, "democracy requires
232. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
233. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, amend. X.
234. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
235. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV.
236. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1132 ("Conventional wisdom acknowledges that the
original Constitution proposed by the Philadelphia convention focused primarily on issues
of organizational structure and democratic self-governance ....").
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self-governing and self-regulating citizens rather than obedient
subjects. ' 237 In the United States, the process of becoming a
self-governing individual capable of meaningful political partici-
pation takes place initially and primarily within the family.238
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, "the child is
not the mere creature of the State. '239 Our liberal democracy
rejects the conformity resulting from direct state indoctrination;
instead it requires intermediate institutions to initiate individuals
into the political life of the state.2 4°
The family's role in nurturing the development of responsi-
ble civic individuals is not its only constitutional function. The
family also serves the vital and unique function of instilling in
children "the sense of belonging and having roots in a distinct
tradition." 241 These diverse "ways of life" promoted by differing
family traditions in turn nourish our liberal political system.
They exist, of course, in tension with the authority of the state,
balancing the state's power with their potential threat of subver-
sive resistance.242  As one commentator has described it, the
family is the "sphere of private non-conformity. 243
The preservation of social diversity is a function which the
237. JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, The Family and Civic Life, in POWER TRIPS AND OTHER
JOURNEYS: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM AS CIVIC DISCOURSE 45, 49 (1990).
238. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 83, at 773 ("In democratic theory as well as in
practice, it is in the family that children are expected to learn the values and beliefs that
democratic institutions later draw on to determine group directions.").
239. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
240. Cf MAx HORKHEIMER, CRITICAL THEORY (1972). Horkheimer notes that:
The family, as one of the most important formative agencies, sees to it that the
kind of human character emerges which social life requires, and gives this human
being in great measure the indispensable adaptability for a specific authority-ori-
ented conduct on which the existence of the bourgeois order largely depends.
Id. at 98. Thus, it is clear that public education cannot be the sole or even primary method
for initiating children into a liberal democracy. It is possible, of course, to imagine an ideal
universal system of private education or communal living that would obviate the need for
family life, but this is not the world in which we live.
241. John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on
the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 821 (1978).
242. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1721
(1988) ("Intermediate organizations not only facilitate individual self-definition and expres-
sion, but also keep the state from replicating itself by nurturing deviance, diversity, and
dissent.") Although I agree with Professor Sullivan's point that intermediate groups such
as the family are "too homogeneous, too partial, too differentiated" to be themselves the
focus of republican values, see id., that is not to say that certain intermediate institutions
may nevertheless foster the "civic, virtuous, [and] deliberative" aspects of the broader polit-
ical enterprise. Cf id
243. HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
INTO FRAUD 97 (1956).
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state cannot assume without undermining the foundation of
democratic liberty.
The intense loyalties, obligations, and moral imperatives
nurtured in families may clash with the requirements of public
authority, for example, when young men refuse to serve in an
unjust war because this runs counter to the religious beliefs
instilled in their families. This, too, is vital for democracy.
Democracy emerged as a form of revolt. Keeping alive a
potential locus for revolt, for particularity, for difference, sus-
tains democracy in the long run. It is no coincidence that all
twentieth-century totalitarian orders labored to destroy the
family as a locus of identity and meaning apart from the state.
Totalitarian politics strives to consume all of life, to allow for a
single public identity, to destroy private life, to require that
individuals identify only with the state rather than with specific
others-family, friends, comrades. 2'
The family is subject to constitutional protection, therefore, not
because it is an arena of negative liberty, as conventional wisdom
would have it, but because it serves both to deploy and to con-
strain the political power of the state.245 The family is a central
element of our constitutional structure of government. In the
progressive view, the Constitution values and protects family life
because it contributes to the preservation of our political order.
Yet not just any family life will do. It would not be a suffi-
cient guarantee of democratic self-government to protect the
family in any form whatsoever.246 To this extent, the value of
family diversity is not unlimited. The lessons learned in the
domestic community-the tradition or way of life into which the
244. ELSHTAIN, supra note 237, at 55; cf. Hafen, supra note 4, at 480 ("Monolithic
control of the value transmission system is a 'hallmark of totalitarianism'; thus, 'for obvious
reasons, the state nursery is the paradigm for a totalitarian society.' ") (quoting P. BERGER
& R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN
PUBLIC POLICY 44 (1977); D. MURPHEY, BURKEAN CONSERVATISM AND CLASSICAL LIB-
ERALISM 270 (1979)). Contrary to the progressive view presented in this Article, Professor
Hafen concludes that "[i]mpermanent relationships that perform some intimate or associa-
tional 'functions' cannot claim the same position as marriage and kinship in ensuring a
political structure that limits government, stabilizes social patterns, and protects pluralistic
liberty through the power of its own relational permanency." Id. at 482.
245. Cf. HORKHEIMER, supra note 240, at 114 (noting that "the family not only edu-
cates for authority in bourgeois society; it also cultivates the dream of a better condition for
mankind").
246. As the Supreme Court warned in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166
(1879), "polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle." While the specific premise, that
polygamy itself threatens the political order, may be contested, the Court's more general
implication regarding the connection between the substance of family life and political
order is sound.
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individual is born-will be brought by the individual into the
larger. political community. Children raised in the shadow of
domestic tyranny will be ill-equipped to assume the obligations
of political liberty. Those raised under the influence of domestic
patriarchy will find it difficult to accept the equality of political
life. To sustain a healthy democratic order, the family must
itself reflect values consistent with those of the political struc-
ture. We must, in other words, hold the family up to a standard
of justice. Loving authority as a principle of family life is not, in
itself, enough.247
Two important points remain to be emphasized. First, a
theory of family justice does not simply transfer the concept of
political justice onto domestic life. Indeed, what is just for the
family may actually constitute injustice within the political
sphere. 248 For example, while it is certainly "just" for parents to
exhibit arbitrary preferences for their own children as against
others; arbitrary preferential treatment in the civil or political
realm is considered discriminatory and unfair. Similarly, chil-
dren may develop better under an authoritarian rather than
democratic form of family life where bedtime is not established
by majoritarian vote. Family justice is not political justice writ
small, but rather a vision of the particular role that the family
and parental authority play in a liberal democracy.
Although the principle of family justice does not call for the
wholesale application of political justice to the domestic realm, it
is nevertheless a concept ofjustice. At its threshold, therefore, a
principle of family justice rejects the traditional view that justice
is incompatible with the familial virtues of love, altruism and
mercy.249 As Susan Okin argues, "Ij]ustice is needed as the pri-
mary, meaning most fundamental, moral virtue even in social
247. See OKIN, supra note 1, at 99-100:
Unless the households in which children are first nurtured, and see their first
examples of human interaction, are based on equality and reciprocity rather than
on dependence and domination-and the latter is too often the case-how can
whatever love they receive from their parents make up for the injustice they see
before them in the relationship between these same parents?
Id
248. See Hafen, supra note 130, at 654 (arguing that "the family that operates as a
true democracy is less likely to provide the security, the role-modeling, the leadership, the
socializing, the growth, or many of the other interests preserved by a basic policy decision
that parental authority is worthy of some state support.").
249. See, eg., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUsTICE 30-35
(1982); Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1293-94
(1932). For a more thorough critique of this view, see OKIN, supra note 1, at 26-33.
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groupings in which aims are largely common and affection fre-
quently prevails."25 0 Relations based on love and affection do
not necessarily preclude, but indeed may be understood to sup-
plement, the principles of justice. Family justice need not
require equality and evenhandedness in ideal family situations in
which family members agree on the common ends of family life.
Where family consensus breaks down, however, or where family
relations are otherwise less than ideal, it should provide a basis
on which individual family members may lay claim to certain
rights within the family. Indeed, it may even be that the virtues
of family life-love, altruism and dependence-will not flourish
in the absence of an underlying communal commitment to just
family relations. The affective virtues may begin to weaken the
moment individual family members perceive that they are being
treated unfairly.
Second, the doctrine of family justice must confront the
question of how to define the family. Beyond marriage, what
forms of relationship fall within the definition? A homosexual
couple, a grandfather and grandchild, a single mother and child,
an adult and unrelated child, and a brother and sister, may lay
claim to the status of family, and a proper doctrine of family
justice must consider the merits of all such claims. All of the
enumerated situations potentially satisfy a broad understanding
of the family as defined by enduring, close-knit, affective rela-
tionships. Family justice calls for the broadest definition of fam-
ily consistent with the goal of sustaining diverse moral traditions
by means of close human connection. Family justice need not
require that family relationships conform to a traditional social
structure; the fact that two people are not married or do not live
together would not in itself exclude them from the definition of
family. Family justice would not, however, define family to
include transitory or superficial relationships, such as those
characteristic of rooming houses, or relationships formed for a
specific purpose, such as religious groups or business organiza-
tions. A substance of enduring, meaningful human connection
rather than traditional form must define the sphere of protected
relations.
In doctrinal terms, family justice would mean that laws
directly or indirectly affecting family life, including laws that
define what a family is, should be subject to heightened review.
250. OKIN, supra note 1, at 29.
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Those family regulations that will be sustained will be those that
do not hinder a child's eventual participation in the broader
political community, nor interfere with community traditions
consistent with our broader political ideals.251 The sphere of
protected relations would include, for example, parental author-
ity exercised in a manner consistent with the child's developing
sense of autonomy. The progressive approach recognizes that
constitutional liberty depends on an ideal that promotes the
development of individuals who possess diverse community val-
ues, but who share a broader conception of political justice. As
one scholar has noted, "Democratic principles give parents a
great deal of room to exercise discretion in structuring their fam-
ilies and educating their children. '252
Ultimately, however, the value of political conformity must
place limits on the degree of family diversity that a liberal
democracy can tolerate.253 Those limits must, of course, be
determined according to the particular circumstances; there can
be no hard and fast rules governing the limits of family author-
ity, as each case will turn on the degree to which the particular
family life frustrates the broader political goals.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 254 is among the Supreme Court's most
notorious cases examining the limits of family freedom. In that
case, although the Court upheld the Amish parents' right to
withdraw their children from participation in the political and
civil life of the broader society, it was nevertheless careful to
emphasize that the Amish community raised their children in
conformity with traditional American values.255 Had the sub-
251. Cf id. at 127 ("Challenging the [public-private] dichotomy does not necessarily
mean denying the usefulness of a concept of privacy or the value of privacy itself in human
life."); Frank Michelman, [Private] Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1783, 1785 (1990) (discussing "the political discourse-I stress political-of per-
sonal rights of privacy and association").
252. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 12 (1987).
253. See id. at 30 ("Because children are members of both families and states, the
educational authority of parents and of polities has to be partial to be justified.").
254. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
255. See id. at 225-26. The Court in Yoder notes that
the Amish are capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citi-
zenship without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade .... T]he Amish
communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal
of the 'sturdy yeoman' who would form the basis of what he considered as the
ideal of a democratic society.
Id. at 225; see also id. at 234 (concluding that withdrawal of Amish children from the last
one or two years of compulsory schooling would not "result in an inability to be self-
supporting or to discharge the duties or responsibilities of citizenship").
1026 [Vol. 67
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
stance of Amish life been less appealing and less compatible with
the ideals underlying the American political system, Yoder
might have been decided differently" 6
Family justice is not a determinative legal concept or doc-
trine. It cannot be reduced to a simple formula with great pre-
dictive power. We may feel fairly certain that a principle of
family justice would uphold a parent's exclusive right to control
the religious upbringing of a young child, but we may feel less
sure regarding the education of an older child who rejects the
parent's beliefs. We may also be clear that the principle of gen-
der equality inherent in any doctrine of family justice forbids
laws requiring spousal notification of a wife's intended abortion.
Because state conduct with respect to the family must further
the individual's ability to assume his or her civic responsibilities,
family justice requires a strong vision of the individual's place in
the broader political community.
Ultimately, a theory of family justice calls for articulation
of the demands of citizenship and of the kind of political society
in which we want to live. The state must walk a middle way
between imposing a traditional authoritarian structure on family
life and promoting a strict individualism at odds with the domes-
tic community. To that end, laws touching on the family must
promote equality among adults, a measure of autonomy for
older children, and fair treatment of all family members.
In light of these general principles, the progressive constitu-
tional goal is to fashion a substantive doctrine of family justice.
As a beginning effort, let us examine the way in which the Court
might have applied a progressive doctrine of family justice in
Hodgson.
3. Family Justice in Hodgson v. Minnesota
In evaluating the two-parent notification statute in Hodg-
son,2 57 a hypothetical Justice taking a progressive approach
would have found guidance in portions of the opinions of Jus-
tices Stevens and Kennedy. From Kennedy, she would have
taken the principle that the state has a legitimate interest in
256. It is even possible to perceive the Amish "way of life" as consistent with the
central liberal principle of tolerance. By withdrawing from the broader political commu-
nity rather thaii challenging it, the Amish were in some ways signalling their willingness to
tolerate opposing views.
257. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
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"recogniz[ing] and promot[ing] the primacy of the family tie. 2 58
In other words, the domestic sphere neither is nor should be a
sphere free from governmental regulation; rather, the state prop-
erly defines many central aspects of family life. The progressive
approach acknowledges the state's involvement in the creation
and maintenance of families, and therefore rejects formal consti-
tutional barriers to state involvement in family life.
Several aspects of the parental notification statute would
raise grave concerns for our hypothetical Justice. First, she
would have to agree with Stevens that the ideal of the intact
nuclear family works a profoundly harmful effect on individuals
living with the reality of family discord. Our hypothetical Jus-
tice would focus on the "sizable and impressive collection of
empirical data documenting the effects of parental notification
statutes and of delaying an abortion."25 9 Stevens devotes the
bulk of his opinion to summarizing the empirical findings
regarding parental notification, detailing the actual effect of such
notification on both intact and non-intact families. He exhibits
careful sensitivity to the experience of parents and children in
violent and dysfunctional families, demonstrating an insightful
recognition of families that are "different," that fail to conform
to the prevailing ideal of family life. Family justice prevents the
hypothetical Justice from concluding, as Justice Kennedy did,
that "[h]ow the family unit responds to [parental] notice is, for
the most part, beyond the State's control. ' 260 The doctrine of
family justice focuses on the family's response because it is at the
moment of response that authority is exercised and the lesson is
learned.
Second, unlike most other decisions faced by a minor, the
decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term is one of funda-
mental and longlasting importance to the young woman.261
That the decision is independently protected under the Due Pro-
cess Clause testifies to its importance. Moreover, motherhood is
not a temporary "disability" lifted on reaching majority, but a
condition lasting an entire lifetime. If a pregnant minor carries a
child to term against her wishes, the state has effectively coerced
258. Id. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. Id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260. Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. In this regard, the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy cannot be equated
with less momentous decisions arguably within full parental control, such as the hour of
bedtime.
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her into a position of dependency. Unlike the voluntary depen-
dency that may characterize some ideal loving relations, this
coerced dependency-physical, psychological and financial-
destroys the individual's ability to be self-governing in any
meaningful sense.262 Young, unmarried mothers in particular
face formidable obstacles to completing their education or to
entering the workforce. The obstacles faced by all parents
become amplified when the parent is a minor: affordable
daycare, flexible work hours, public transportation, and suffi-
cient wages and benefits. Under these conditions, such mothers
are ill-equipped for the task of raising their children to become
responsible, independent citizens. To the contrary, it is entirely
possible that an unwanted teenage pregnancy will begin a gen-
erational cycle of financial dependency and political
disengagement.
Proponents of the parental notification statute might argue
that the statute is necessary to ensure that a minor girl does not
make the wrong decision and be forced to live with the conse-
quences of a regretted abortion. Yet their argument ignores the
fact that in such circumstances, an individual must live with the
moral consequences of her own decision. In contrast, an individ-
ual who is coerced into carrying her pregnancy to term under
the statute263 must live with the moral consequences of a deci-
sion imposed on her. In a society committed to self-government,
it would be fundamentally unjust for the state and parents acting
together to override the pregnant minor's wishes with respect to
a decision of such important dimensions.
The parental notification statute teaches the pregnant minor
a powerful lesson regarding the consequences of her own sexual-
ity. She learns that the state may effectively deprive her of the
262. To this extent, the involuntary dependency of the pregnant minor is similar to
that of the mother who exclusively works at home against her wishes. A woman might
involuntarily remain at home because her husband disapproves of mothers working outside
the home; because she cannot find adequate daycare; because her job lacks sufficient flexi-
bility; or because her husband does not carry his share of the household responsibilities. In
constitutional terms, the theory of family justice would require heightened scrutiny for laws
that inhibit a mother's opportunity to enter the workforce. In broader moral terms, the
theory would require fathers to participate equally in childrearing where women choose to
work outside the home, and require employers to provide those fathers with the flexibility
needed for such arrangements.
263. Under the statute, a pregnant minor would be coerced into carrying her preg-
nancy to term if she chooses not to tell her parents, or where she notifies them in compli-
ance with the statute and they exert financial or other pressures on her that inhibit her
ability to terminate the pregnancy.
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right to terminate her pregnancy without also providing her the
means to raise her child or support her new family. The state
denies her this right in the name of protecting family life without
first establishing whether a family life of any meaning actually
exists for her. Indeed, a minor's reluctance to inform her par-
ents voluntarily is powerful evidence that the ideal family image
underlying the notification statute is nonexistent. In view of the
importance of the decision at stake, the expressed wishes of the
pregnant minor, and the threat of a coerced dependency com-
promising the minor's ability to participate in the full civil and
political life of the community, our hypothetical Justice would
hold that the parental notification statute violates the
Constitution.
The progressive approach would prevent states from legis-
lating "family values" without taking responsibility for their
social effects. This approach rejects Kennedy's conclusion that
"[h]ow the family unit responds to [parental] notice is, for the
most part, beyond the State's control." 2  In the progressive
view, the response of the family unit is not merely a state respon-
sibility, but a constitutional concern as well. Applying a stan-
dard of family justice, our Justice will ensure that public
aspirations for family life do not unjustly burden the lives of
those who are unable to conform to such ideals. This is, in some
respects, a pragmatic task. A doctrine of family justice requires
that all individuals-whether nonconforming, different or sim-
ply pregnant-share in the normative political life of the
community.
V. CONCLUSION
The progressive view of the family in constitutional law
developed in this Article has both critical and normative power.
In its critical mode, it focuses on revealing the political signifi-
cance of family life inherent in the traditional doctrine of consti-
tutional privacy. This critique of constitutional privacy takes a
doctrinal form by describing the way in which the doctrine of
individual autonomy politicizes the sphere of family relations.
The critique also takes an historical form by illuminating the
way in which the family has always been subject to public con-
trol and regulation. In its normative mode, the progressive
264. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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approach uses these critical insights to articulate a constitutional
vision that recognizes the role of the family in maintaining the
political structure of our liberal democracy. The family must be
understood as both facilitating and constraining the exercise of
state power vis-a-vis the individual. Ultimately, it is an
approach that demands that we aspire only to those family ideals
that comport with the individual's development into a responsi-
ble, self-directing participant in civil and political life. It under-
stands that this development requires that families be given the
room to nurture their own-potentially subversive-moral tra-
ditions. More affirmatively, it understands that political justice
derives in no small measure from the lived justice of family life.
To the extent that the Supreme Court's emerging deference
to community tradition recognizes the state's role in shaping
public aspirations for family life, it has moved constitutional law
in a worthwhile direction. Yet the Court has failed to rise to the
challenge of its own insight into the political nature of family
life. The progressive doctrine of family justice offered here
rejects the view that our constitutional tradition requires defer-
ence to the state's moral decisions concerning family life. To the
contrary, the Constitution should be understood to establish a
principle of family justice. The bonds of domestic relations can-
not support a liberal democracy unless those relations are also
inherently just. Determining precisely what it means for family
relations to be just is the constitutional challenge that awaits us.
1993] 1031

